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IS THE RIGHT TO VOTE REALLY
FUNDAMENTAL?
Joshua A. Douglas*
This Article poses a question at the core of our democracy: Is the
constitutional right to vote a fundamental right? The answer, surprisingly, is "not always."
Foroverforty years, the Supreme Court has fostered confusion surrounding the right to vote by creating two lines of election law cases. In
one breath the Court calls the right to vote fundamental and applies
strict scrutiny review. In another, the Courtfails to recognize the right
as fundamental and uses a lower level of scrutiny. These two lines of
cases have coexisted, leaving lower courts and litigants with little guidance on how to approachfuture election law disputes. The problem
inherent in this approach is that it derogates the value of having an individual right to vote and poses significant questions about the efficacy of
our notion of democratic self-governance.
The Court's most recent attempt in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board, the voter identification case, muddled this question even
further. With Crawford as a background, this Article closely examines
the Court's inconsistentapproachesfor construing the right to vote. After delineating the negative implications of this fractured methodology,
the Article proposes a two-part solution: first, courts should distinguish
between cases that directly impact voters from disputes involving indirect burdens on individuals. Regulations involving direct burdens on individuals-such as laws about the value of one's vote or who is eligible
for the franchise-impact the fundamental right to vote and deserve
strict scrutiny review. Second, courts should customize the approach to
strict scrutinyfor election law disputes, with an addedfocus on the narrowly tailoredprong, so as to recognize the value of the right to vote
while still allowing states to ensure fairness through their election regulations. Thus, instead of grasping for an overarching principle that
would bring a semblance of unity to all election law cases, the Article
suggests that courts approach the right to vote differently depending on
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Edward C. Prado, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. I benefitted greatly from the comments and suggestions I received from Professors Heather Gerken, Orin Kerr, Ira "Chip" Lupu, Spencer Overton, Dan Tokaji, Adam Winkler, and Dean Fred Lawrence. Special thanks also to Jonathan Bond, Jessica Golby, Bryan
Lammon, Joseph R. Oliveri, Maya Song, and Benjamin Wallfisch for reading early drafts of
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which political actor suffers the most direct burden from the regulation
at issue.
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INTRODUCTION

When Americans are surveyed about what rights are most valued
under their Constitution, the responses inevitably include the right to
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vote.' Most Americans believe that they have a voice in their democracy
because they can exercise that right. Every four years, advocacy groups
urge citizens to vote in that year's presidential election. 2 We fight wars
overseas in part to help people in foreign countries achieve the freedom
that comes with the ability to cast a ballot. 3 In short, the right to vote is
part of our ethos for what it means to be an American.
The problem, however, is that our legal system has not always given
an individual's right to vote the same venerated status as it has given
many other important rights. Although the right to vote is considered a
"fundamental" right, courts often treat the right to vote as less than fundamental by employing a low level of scrutiny to election law challenges. Thus, we are faced with a dichotomy: most people believe that
the right to vote is one of the most important rights in our democracy, but
courts do not always treat the right as such. The Supreme Court has
contributed to this confusion by creating two lines of election law cases.
In one breath, the Court calls the right to vote "fundamental" and applies
strict scrutiny review. 4 In another, the Court fails to give the right the
status of a fundamental right by using a lower level of scrutiny. 5 These
two lines of cases have coexisted, providing lower courts and litigants
with little guidance on how to approach future election law disputes.
The right to vote-one of our most cherished rights-is often given short
shrift in our constitutional jurisprudence.
This Article challenges that approach by deconstructing key election
law cases and positing a new theory for future election law disputes.
This new approach has two steps: First, courts should distinguish between laws that directly impact voters from disputes involving indirect
burdens. Regulations involving direct burdens on individuals-such as
cases about the value of one's vote or who is eligible for the franchiseimpact the fundamental right to vote and deserve strict scrutiny review.
This is because in the realm of election law, the fundamental right to vote
is really an individualized concern regarding the exercise of the
franchise. In contrast, regulations that merely impact voters indirectly
should enjoy a lower level of scrutiny so long as the laws do not impose
a "severe burden." Second, courts should customize the approach to
strict scrutiny for election law disputes to recognize the value of the right
1 See Brian Pinaire et al., Barred from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FoRDHAM Ua. L.J. 1519, 1533-34 (2003) (showing that 93.2%
of survey respondents believe that the right to vote is either the most important or one of the
most important rights in a democracy).
2 See Kathy Kiely, Volunteers Work to Last Minute, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 2004, at 3A.
3 See, e.g., Paul Wiseman, Taliban on the Run but Farfrom Vanquished, USA TODAY,
July 26, 2005, at IA.
4 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
5 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
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to vote while still allowing states to ensure fairness through their election
regulations.
Part I of this Article examines what makes a right fundamental and
identifies the Court's inconsistent approach in several areas of election
law jurisprudence. Part II attempts to locate a principled reason for treating the right as sometimes fundamental, sometimes not. Part III examines the implications of the Court's fractured approach by analyzing the
resulting confusion among lower courts and the derogation of the importance of the right involved. Finally, Part IV posits that the Court could
eliminate this dichotomy through two significant revisions to current
election law jurisprudence. First, this Article suggests that the Court
should redefine the fundamental right to vote as an individual right that is
implicated only when a law directly burdens voters, and second, the
Court should adopt a particularized form of strict scrutiny review for
these cases.
The Court recently had the opportunity to examine these questions,
but instead of clarifying whether the right to vote is always fundamental,
the Court merely contributed to the confusion. 6 In Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, the Court upheld Indiana's law requiring voters
to show a government issued identification upon voting. 7 Instead of
promulgating a coherent approach to election law cases, the Court issued
four different opinions that each described the proper methodology in
different ways. 8 Conspicuously missing from the Court's decision was a
discussion of when an election law implicates the fundamental right to
vote. This Article fills that void.
As the fractured methodology of the Crawford decision demonstrates, the question this Article poses is vitally important to the future of
election litigation. This Article places the Court's approach to the right
to vote in the fundamental rights context to demonstrate how the Court
has effectively diminished what it means for an individual to possess that
right. That is, the Court's current ad hoc jurisprudence for election law
cases creates confusion regarding what it means to enjoy the fundamental
right to vote.

See id.
Id. at 1623-24.
Id. at 1613 (plurality opinion); id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6

7
8
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I.

A

FRACTURED APPROACH: THE COURT'S INCONSISTENT
TREATMENT OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE

A.

The Right to Vote Under Equal Protection Jurisprudence

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "No State shall... deny to any person.., the equal protection of
the laws." 9 The Supreme Court has promulgated a three-tiered mechanism for analyzing whether a law infringes on the Equal Protection
Clause.10 Laws that impact a suspect class or infringe on a fundamental
right must pass strict scrutiny review.' 1 Laws that discriminate based on
gender are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.1 2 A court must
uphold all other laws under rational basis review if they are rationally
13
related to a legitimate state interest.
The Supreme Court has identified various rights as fundamental
based on their importance to ensuring individual liberty and self-governance. 14 That is, certain rights are "preferred" because they are central to
providing a check on the power of the government to infringe on particular realms of individual autonomy. 15 Professor Laurence Tribe explains
the foundation of "fundamental rights" jurisprudence by noting that certain "particular forms of expression, action, or opportunity perceived as
touching more deeply and permanently on human personality

regarded as the constituents of freedom."'

16

. .

. [are]

These rights include the right

9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).

11 See id. Although courts often state that infringement of fundamental rights triggers
strict scrutiny review, some scholars have disagreed, arguing that this "well-worn adage" is
simply not true. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamenta' Rights,
23 CONST. COMMENT. 227 (2006).
12 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
13 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that "if a law neither
burdens a fundamental ight nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end"); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985).
14 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (noting that fundamental
rights are those "found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
15 Winkler, supra note 11, at 236 ("The Court has not made clear precisely why some
rights are to be preferred over others, but traditional theories emphasize that some rights are so
central to self-government and human dignity as to warrant special judicial protection.").
16 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTmONAL LAW 770 (Foundation Press 1990)
(1978).
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to marry, 17 the right to procreate, 18 the right to interstate travel, 19 and,
supposedly, the right to vote. 20 Some of these fundamental rights, while

not enumerated in the Constitution, still receive full constitutional protection.2' In contrast, the Court has held that other rights are not fundamental, such as the right to government employment 22 or the right to a public
education, 2 3 as these rights do not implicate the core individual interests
at the heart of self-governance.
Due to the limited manner in which the government may encroach
upon fundamental rights, these rights receive greater constitutional protection. For example, a court must analyze a law that infringes on the
fundamental right to travel among the states under strict scrutiny, 24 while
a law that infringes on the (non-fundamental) right to public education
must withstand only rational basis review. 25 Indeed, the Court has declared that "equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right," and that otherwise a court
should use a lower level of scrutiny. 26 This categorization comports with
the notion that certain rights are more important and therefore deserve
27
special protection from governmental infringement.
17 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967).
18 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536-37 (1942). Skinner may have been the beginning of the "implied fundamental rights" era of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
See Robert C. Farrell, An Excess of Methods: Identifying Implied FundamentalRights in the
Supreme Court, 26 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 203, 207 (2007). Professor Farrell notes:
[T]o speak of an implied fundamental right "arising under" the Equal Protection
Clause is technically inaccurate since that Clause creates no substantive rights.
Rather, when the Court speaks of an implied fundamental right in an equal protection case, it is finding a freestanding implied fundamental right-that is, a right
independent of the term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause and independent of any
other explicit provision in the Constitution-and then imposing a very strict comparative standard of equality on classifications that infringe on such an implied right.
What this means is that implied fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection
Clause inevitably involve rights implied from somewhere other than the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 210 n.42.
19 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966).
20 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964); see also infra Part I.B.
21 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (holding that the right to
interstate travel is a fundamental right).
22 Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976).
23 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
24 See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630-31.
25 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
26 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312 (applying rational basis to a challenge of a state law that
mandated retirement of uniformed police officers at age fifty).
27 As one commentator has noted,
The doctrine of fundamental rights and protected liberty interests has been a recurring theme in the Anglo-American legal tradition. The doctrine simply holds that
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Most scholars have assumed that the right to vote is a fundamental
right. This is not surprising considering that voting represents the epitome of self-governance. Additionally, the Supreme Court has included
the right to vote in its list of fundamental rights and has never explicitly
stated that the right is not fundamental. 28 Professor Lani Guinier describes the right to vote as "a claim [to] the fundamental right to express
and represent ideas."'2 9 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky notes that "the Su-

preme Court repeatedly has declared that the right to vote is a fundamental right protected under equal protection, ' 30 while Professor Pamela
Karlan states, in the context of felon disenfranchisement, that "[tioday,
of course, the Court has recognized the right to vote as a fundamental
right."' 3 1 Professor Richard Hasen has come closest to acknowledging
32
that the Court does not always treat the right to vote as fundamental.
there are certain rights which emanate from considerations of fairness or universal
principles of justice superior to the sources of positive law. Fundamental rights and
liberty interests were entitled to special protection from government intrusion by
virtue of their own "intrinsic excellence." A powerful reason for recognizing the
"intrinsic excellence" of these fights is that they reconcile government power with
individual autonomy by identifying their relative positions in society.
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, ConstitutionalizingRoe, Casey and Carhart: A Legislative Due-Process
Anti-DiscriminationPrinciple that Gives ConstitutionalContent to the "Undue Burden" Standard of Review Applied to Abortion Control Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 211, 219 n.21 (2001) (citations omitted).
28 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("Undoubtedly, the fight of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the fight to
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized."). Even Congress, in the National Voter Registration Act, called the
fight to vote a "fundamental fight." 42 U.S.C. §1973gg ("The Congress finds that (1) the fight
of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental fight.").
29 LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 93 (1994). Professor Guinier continues by noting that "[v]oting is not
just about winning elections. People participate in politics to have their ideas and interests
represented, not simply to win contested seats." Id.
30 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

PRINCIPLES AND

POLICIES 842 (Aspen

Law & Business 2002) (1997) (citations omitted).
31 Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote,
71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1345, 1368 n.136 (2003) ("Thus, to the extent that the characterization of
disenfranchisement as nonpunitive depends on its depriving individuals of something that is
never a right in the first place, that characterization is no longer valid."); see also Pamela S.
Karlan, Framingthe Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively ImpairedIndividuals, 38 McGEORGE
L. REV. 917, 923 (2007) ("The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to vote is a (conditional) fundamental right-that is, '[o]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate,' the state
cannot exclude qualified citizens from participating. However, the constitutional right remains, at its core, a negative right protected only against state interference." (citations omitted)). Professor Spencer Overton also assumed that the right to vote is fundamental when
analyzing the impact of voter identification laws. Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105
MICH. L. REv. 631, 664 (2007) ("[A] photo-identification requirement may unduly burden the
fundamental right to vote that stems from the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
32 Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Futureof Equal ProtectionLaw in Elections,
29

FLA. ST. U. L. REv.

377, 378-79 (2001).
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He argues that even though Bush v. Gore33 involved a "fundamental
right," the Court's analysis was "superficial" because it "[spoke] the language of strict scrutiny but appl[ied] something much less than strict
scrutiny. '34 Professor Christopher Elmendorf also recognizes that "[o]n
first glance, it may be puzzling that any class of laws that burden fundamental rights would receive light-touch judicial review. ' 35 After pointing out this discrepancy, Professor Elmendorf describes his view of the
Court's current approach: "[L]aws pertaining to electoral mechanics
carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, even though they touch
upon fundamental rights of voting and political association. ' 36 However,
if an analysis of the law reveals "something alarming," then "the presumption of constitutionality may be reversed, and the Court will take a
37
close look at the law's tailoring and the justifications asserted for it."
No scholar, however, has taken an in-depth look at the Court's election
law cases from a fundamental rights perspective to determine when, and
how often, the Court deviates from its declaration that the right to vote is
a fundamental right.
The Court first alluded to the right to vote as fundamental as far
back as 1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.38 In discussing the concept of sovereignty, the Court noted that the right to vote, although not "strictly" a
"natural right," "is [still] regarded as a fundamental political right....
preservative of all rights. ' 39 The Court reiterated this theme in 1932 in
Smiley v. Holm, noting that the Constitution provides authority for the
state to "enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards
which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved."'40 However, history would not repeat itself. In several key areas of election law jurisprudence, the Court has vacillated
between analyzing the right to vote as a fundamental right and treating it
as something other than fundamental.
33 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
34 Hasen, supra note 32, at 378-79 ("Moreover, the Court's own analysis was superficial. It failed to explain or justify its large extension of precedent, and, most importantly,
given the fact that a 'fundamental right' was involved, the Court appeared to speak the language of strict scrutiny but apply something much less than strict scrutiny.").
35 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 327 (2007). Professor Elmendorf delineates several "litmus-paper tests" that the Court has created for setting the level of scrutiny
in cases involving electoral mechanics. Id. at 322-23.
36 Id. at 336.

37 Id. at 336-37.
38 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
39 Id.

40 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932); see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510,
524 (2001) (quoting this same passage).

2008]

B.

Is THE RIGHT TO VOTE REALLY FUNDAMENTAL?

Shifting Principles: The Court's Inconsistent Approach to the
Right to Vote

1. Who Can Vote?
Election law cases involving eligibility to cast a ballot demonstrate
a dichotomy of approaches. At one time, the Court always construed the
right to vote in the context of voter eligibility as a fundamental right, but
now the jurisprudence is not as clear.
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court struck down a
poll tax that directly restricted the exercise of the fundamental right to
vote in state elections. 4 1 The Court used the mantra of fundamental

rights because the law made distinctions concerning who was eligible for
the franchise. 42 Similarly, in Kramer v. Union Free School District No.
15, the Court considered whether New York could limit individuals who
were eligible to vote in school district elections to property owners and
parents. 43 The Court held that restrictions on the franchise other than

residence, age, and citizenship must promote a compelling state interest
to survive constitutional attack. 44 Indeed, the Court's language in many
of these cases is particularly telling regarding the importance of the right
involved. In Dunn v. Blumstein, where the Court struck down a Tennessee durational residence requirement for voting while using the language
of fundamental rights, the Court noted, "In decision after decision, this

Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right
to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the
jurisdiction.

' '45

41 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). Professor Farrell notes that
because the Constitution does not explicitly convey the right to vote to anyone, the Court was
engaging in an "implied fundamental rights" analysis. See Farrell, supra note 18, at 215-16
("[The comparative nature of the equal protection mandate means that, if the state wants to
deprive certain individuals of the right to vote, it has to treat everyone that way.").
42 See Harper, 383 U.S. at 667-68.
43 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
44 Id. at 627; cf Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 362 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the result) (surmising that Kramer elevated the level of scrutiny for voting rights cases from
the Court's previous jurisprudence under McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of Chi., 394
U.S. 802, 807-08 (1969)). Justice Blackmun's comment makes little sense if one considers
that the Court in McDonald used a lower level of scrutiny because it determined that the
statute at issue did not infringe on the fundamental right to vote but instead involved the less
important privilege to receive absentee ballots. See McDonald, 394 U.S. at 807-08. Indeed,
in the same year that the Court decided Kramer, the Court reiterated that strict scrutiny is the
appropriate level of scrutiny for a challenge to a statute that created a limited purpose election
and granted the right to vote in that election to certain otherwise qualified voters but not to
others. See Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969); see also Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965) (holding that a state may not prohibit military personnel stationed
in the state from voting because this amounted to invidious discrimination on the basis of how
people of a certain occupation may vote).
45 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336; see also Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970) ("[T]he
right to vote, as the citizen's fink to his laws and government, is protective of all fundamental
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However, the Court has not always used a fundamental rights approach when considering a state election regulation that distinguishes eligible voters from non-eligible voters. As early as 1959, in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections, the Court upheld a literacy requirement for eligibility for the franchise and noted that the state enjoys
"[a] wide scope for exercise of jurisdiction" when adopting requirements
for the right to vote. 46 Because the literacy requirement did not directly
discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, or sex, the Court did not
employ strict scrutiny review.
Stemming from the approach in Lassiter, the Court began to recognize the "integrity of the electoral process" as a legitimate (as opposed to
compelling) state interest in election law cases. 47 In Rosario v. Rockefeller, the Court upheld a New York scheme that required an otherwiseeligible voter to enroll in a political party before the previous general
election to participate in the next primary election. 4 8 The effect of the
statute was to require a voter to enroll in the party of his or her choice at
least thirty days before the general election in November to vote in the
subsequent primary. 49 Upholding the law, the Court noted that "preservation of the integrity of the electoral process is a legitimate and valid
state goal," and that the statute helped the state achieve this goal by deterring party raiding in a primary election. 50 In sum, the Court concluded
that the statute "is thus tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and is
in no sense invidious or arbitrary."' 5 1 Notably, the Court upheld the law
not because the state demonstrated that the regulation was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, but instead because the state
52
showed that the law achieved merely a legitimate goal.
In Burdick v. Takushi, a case involving whether the state of Hawaii
could prohibit its voters from writing-in a candidate of their choice, 53 the
Court explicitly rejected its earlier reliance on strict scrutiny to analyze
rights and privileges. And before that right can be restricted, the purpose of the restriction and
the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny." (internal citations omitted)).
46 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51-53 (1959). Congress's passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Court's interpretation of the Act in
relation to New York's literacy requirement effectively overruled the decision in Lassiter.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-56 (1966).
47 See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973). Demonstrating that it was not
relying on strict scrutiny review, the Court used the words "legitimate and valid" as opposed to
"compelling" when describing the required state interest. Id.
48 Id. at 753-54, 762.
49 Id. at 754.
50 Id. at 761-62.
51 Id. at 762.
52 Id.
53 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992).
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most voting rights claims. 54 The Court stated, "[T]o subject every voting
regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest ... would tie the hands of

States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently. '5 5 Instead, only laws that impose a "severe" burden warrant
strict scrutiny review. 56 Laws that impose "reasonable, nondiscriminatory" burdens are constitutional if the state demonstrates an "important
regulatory interest. '5 7 Thus, the Court no longer considered the right to
vote to be fundamental at all times, even though the law in question
directly affected a voter's ability to express his or her choice at the polls.
One particularly telling point that brings out the dichotomy from
Burdick is that in the very same year, the Court decided Burson v. Freeman, which also was a case about a voter's experience at the polls. 58 In
Burson, the Court analyzed a law that restricted advertising within a certain zone around a polling place, noting that the law involved a "clash"
between two fundamental rights-the right to vote and the right to freedom of expression. 59 The Court upheld the law because, for the purposes
of that case, the right to vote was paramount. 60 Thus, within a matter of
months, the Court held both that the right to vote is a fundamental right
(Burson)6I and that not all voting rights cases require strict scrutiny review (i.e., that the right to vote is not necessarily fundamental) (Burdick).62 Although the cases contained different facts-Burdick involved
a limitation on voters' choices 63 while Burson involved a voter's experience while waiting in line to vote64-it seems particularly surprising that
the Court would not even cite Burson in Burdick given the Court's bold
language in Burson about the importance of the right to vote. 65 Somehow, by the time the Court decided Burdick, it seemed to have forgotten
that the right to vote is usually considered a fundamental right.
Whether a state can require a voter to present photo identification to
be able to vote is a recent contentious issue implicating voter eligibility.
Laws that require voters to show photo identification to vote directly
54 Id. at 433.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 434.

57 Id.
58 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 194-95 (1992).
59 See id. at 196.
60 See id. at 211.

61 See id.
62 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433-34.
63 See id. at 430.
64

See Burson, 504 U.S. at 196.

65 "This Court has recognized that the 'right to vote freely for the candidate of one's

choice is of the essence of a democratic society."' Id. at 199 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
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impact individuals, as those eligible voters who do not present identifica-

tion are precluded from voting. 6 6 When considering this question last
term in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Court very easily could have clarified that when it comes to voter eligibility, the right to
vote is a fundamental right. 67 Unfortunately, however, the Court failed
to articulate the scope of the right to vote and provided little guidance for
future election law disputes.
The Court's failure to consider whether the voter identification law
implicated a fundamental right had its roots in its unfaithful description
of Harperv. Virginia Board of Elections, which invalidated a law requiring voters to pay a poll tax. 6 8 The lead opinion in Crawford, written by
Justice Stevens on behalf of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice
Kennedy, purportedly relies on Harper,but the opinion actually misconstrues Harperfrom the outset.69 The opinion states that Harperapplied
a "stricter standard" of review that was rooted in the determination of
whether a statute "invidiously discriminate [s]. '

70

The Court reasoned,

"However slight that burden may appear, as Harper demonstrates, it
must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests 'sufficiently
weighty to justify the limitation.' "71 Notably, the words "relevant and
legitimate state interests"-typically the language of rational basis 72-do

not appear in Harper. Thus, by importing this language into Harper,the
lead opinion in Crawford signaled its belief that Harperdid not actually
73
use strict scrutiny.
The language in Harperand the way subsequent Supreme Court and
circuit court cases have construed Harper, however, belies this contention. On several occasions, the Court has described Harperas requiring
strict scrutiny for laws that infringe on the right to vote. 74 Lower courts
have also relied on Harperfor the proposition that strict scrutiny applies
66 See, e,g., Overton, supra note 31, at 660 (presenting data to suggest that "a photoidentification requirement would exclude some legitimate voters and would have a disparate
demographic impact").
67 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
68 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
69 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615-16 (plurality opinion).
70 Id. at 1615.
71 Id. at 1616.
72 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973).
73 Compare Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (describing Harper as requiring "relevant and
legitimate state interests"), with Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 (requiring the law to be "closely
scrutinized and carefully confined").
74 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
142 (1972). In his dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Justice
Marshall noted-citing Harper-that strict scrutiny is appropriate when "discrimination affects an important individual interest." 411 U.S. at 102 n.61 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Douglas, who wrote the opinion in Harper,joined Justice Marshall's dissent. Id. at 70. Thus,
even the author of Harper agreed with the assessment that Harper employed strict scrutiny
review.
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to classifications that burden fundamental rights. 75 Thus, the Court in
Crawford was disingenuous in implying that Harper simply required
"relevant and legitimate state interests" '76 as opposed to a narrowly tailored, compelling governmental interest pursuant to traditional strict
scrutiny review.
After misconstruing the level of scrutiny in Harper,Justice Stevens'
lead opinion describes the inquiry into burdens for election law cases in a
novel way. Instead of referring to "severe burdens," which is the language the Court had typically used post-Burdick, the Court discussed
77
whether the voter identification law imposed a "substantial burden.
Furthermore, to justify this burden, the Court held that the state merely
has to show a "sufficient justification," or that the state interests are
"neutral" and "sufficiently strong. ' 78 Therefore, Justice Stevens' lead
opinion seems to apply a form of intermediate scrutiny, because the burden on voters was only "limited," and the state justified the photo identification law with "valid neutral justifications. '79 Instead of first
determining whether the law imposed a severe burden, and then using
strict scrutiny for severe burdens and a lower standard for other burdens-which had been the Court's approach under Burdick-the Court
employed a balancing test from the outset. This balancing test attempted
to measure both the magnitude of the burden and the state's justifications
for the law. 80
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Crawford at least remained
consistent with previous case law. 8' He simply set forth the Burdick
framework and concluded that Indiana's photo identification law did not
impose a severe burden on voters. 82 However, Justice Scalia also suggested that the Burdick test is appropriate for any law "respecting the
right to vote," failing to distinguish between types of burdens and their
affect on various actors in the political scheme. 83 This position seems
untenable given that election laws burden different groups in different
ways, as discussed below. But Justice Scalia was correct in one respect,
75 See, e.g., Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 645 (3d Cir. 2003); Narragansett
Indian Tribe v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 158 F.3d 1335, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (4th Cir. 1993).
76 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616.
77 Id. at 1621.
78 Id. at 1619, 1620, 1624.
79 Id. at 1623, 1624.
80 Id.; see also Chris Elmendorf, JudicialReview of Electoral Mechanics After Crawford
(May 6, 2008), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=417 ("Much
to my surprise, six Justices unequivocally affirmed that Burdick requires open-ended balancing, rather than a threshold classification of the challenged requirement as 'severe' or 'not
severe.' ").
81 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
82 Id. at 1624-25.
83 Id. at 1624.
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stating that the lead opinion provides "no certainty" for future election
84
law disputes.
The only place where the words "fundamental right" appear in
Crawford is in Justice Souter's dissent. 85 However, even though Justice
Souter called the right to vote a "fundamental right," he did not apply
typical strict scrutiny review. 86 Instead, he stated that election law cases
"avoid[ ] pre-set levels of scrutiny in favor of a sliding-scale balancing
analysis. '87 Thus, Justice Souter was more explicit than Justice Stevens
in shifting the analysis to a weighing of the various interests from the
outset. But Justice Souter seemed equivocal in his approach to the balancing test. He described the burdens of Indiana's voter identification
law as "nontrivial," "particularly onerous," a "high hurdle," and "serious," but never "severe.1 88 Although he used strong language to describe the burdens at issue, he never explained what made the burdens
"serious" but not "severe." Based on this language, it is surprising that
Justice Souter did not apply strict scrutiny, especially given his statement
that the "unfettered" right to vote is a "fundamental right" and his
description of the burdens of the photo identification law, which suggest
he believed the burdens actually were "severe." 89 The upshot of Justice
Souter's opinion is that it remains unclear, under his approach, what
types of burdens would be "severe" enough to trigger strict scrutiny
review.
Justice Breyer's dissent adds little to discern how to approach future
voting rights cases. 90 He agreed that election law cases now require a
balancing test, and he believed that Indiana's photo identification law
imposed a "disproportionate" burden on eligible voters who lacked identification. 9 1 However, Justice Breyer did not extrapolate on how to apply
this balancing test.
The import of Crawford is as follows: Justice Stevens (joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy), Justice Souter (joined by
Justice Ginsburg), and Justice Breyer believe that some type of balancing
test applies to election law disputes. However, in their opinions, Justice
Stevens and Justice Breyer failed to define how to apply that balancing
test, and Justice Souter described the burdens in the case in a manner that
suggests he actually believed they were "severe" and would require strict
scrutiny review. Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas and Justice
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 1627.
Id. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1628.

Id.
Id. at 1632, 1634.
Id. at 1627, 1628, 1629-31.
Id. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Id.
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Alito) adhered to Burdick, which requires a threshold inquiry into the
magnitude of the burden and calls for strict scrutiny only for burdens that
are "severe." Only Justice Souter (joined by Justice Ginsburg) described
the right to vote as a "fundamental right." Given all of this, if nothing
else, the legacy of Crawford certainly will not be clarity.
The foregoing demonstrates that in cases involving who can vote in
an election or a voter's experience at the polls, the Court sometimes considers the right to vote as fundamental and sometimes conspicuously
omits any fundamental rights language. While each case has its own
permutations, at the core the questions presented are the same: how far
may the state go in enacting regulations to determine eligibility for the
franchise or impact a voter's experience at the polls? A coherent approach that is consistent with both history and the importance of voting
in our democracy would always use a fundamental rights approach when
the rights of individual voters are at stake. But that is not the reality of
how the Court currently handles election law cases involving laws that
directly burden individual voters.
2.

Who May Be a Candidate?

In cases involving access to the ballot, the Court has exhibited the
same trend of vacillating between using strict scrutiny and a lower level
of scrutiny depending on whether the Court considers the right in the
particular case to be fundamental. In Williams v. Rhodes, the Court
struck down a series of Ohio ballot access laws that made it virtually
impossible for any candidate of a party except the Republican and Democratic parties to qualify for the ballot. 92 In its opinion, the Court noted
that a state must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest to justify a law that places an unequal burden on minority voting groups. 93
Similarly, in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
the Court invalidated a state law that imposed a different signature requirement for access to the ballot for new political parties in statewide
elections as opposed to elections in political subdivisions. 94 The Court
noted that laws that restrict access to the ballot also "implicate the right
to vote" because these laws "limit[ ] the choices available to voters," and
that the law under consideration was not the "least restrictive means" of
achieving the state's goal of ensuring that candidates on a ballot are actually serious candidates who have a modicum of support. 95 Thus, when
92 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
93 See id.
94 See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 175-77, 187
(1979). The upshot of the regulations was to make appearing on the ballot in Chicago much
more difficult than appearing on the ballot for a statewide position. Id.
95 Id. at 184, 186. The Court also noted in Bullock v. Carter,
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the "vital individual right[ ]" to vote is at stake, "a State must establish
'96
that its classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest."
The story was quite different, however, in Storer v. Brown, which
involved a similar ballot access question involving a California law that
required independent candidates to be disaffiliated with a prior political
party for one year before the primary. 97 In Storer, the Court in effect
shifted the level of scrutiny for most cases where a plaintiff asserts the
infringement of the franchise:
It has never been suggested that [the rule from previous
case law] automatically invalidates every substantial restriction on the right to vote or to associate. Nor could
this be the case under our Constitution where the States
are given the initial task of determining the qualifications of voters who will elect members of Congress....
Moreover, as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to
accompany the democratic processes .... It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election
98
laws would fail to pass muster under our cases.
Thus, a reviewing court need not always use strict scrutiny to analyze an election law claim, because states are allowed to engage in "substantial regulation of elections." 99 After Storer, it was clear that election
law cases must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, but it was not clear
when strict scrutiny was appropriate as opposed to a lower level of
scrutiny.
The Court attempted to provide some guidance in Anderson v. Celebrezze when it promulgated what is now known as the "balancing of the
interests" or "severe burden" test. 100 In Anderson, the Court analyzed an
The initial and direct impact of filing fees is felt by aspirants for office, rather than
voters, and the Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review. However, the rights of voters and
the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect
candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.
405 U.S. 134, 142 (1972).

96 IlL State Bd., 440 U.S. at 184; see also Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144 (using strict scrutiny
to strike down Texas's scheme of requiring all candidates to pay a filing fee because the law
had a "real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise").
97 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726-27 (1974).
98 Id. at 729-30 (citations omitted).
99 Id. at 730.
100 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983). I have previously criticized

the Court's application of the severe burden test. See Joshua A. Douglas, Note, A Vote for
Clarity: Updating the Supreme Court'sSevere Burden Testfor State Election Regulations That
Adversely Impact an Individual'sRight to Vote, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 372 (2007); see also
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Ohio election statute that required independent candidates for president
to register for an election well before the two major parties had even
determined their nominees. 1 0' The Court attempted to create a formula
to consider a challenge to a state's election laws:
[A] court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical
process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It
must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the
Court must not only determine the legitimacy and
strength of each of those interests, it also must consider
the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiffs rights. Only after weighing all
these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is
unconstitutional. 102
Thus, Anderson confirmed that the Court no longer approached an
election law case from a fundamental rights framework. Instead, the
Court employed a balancing test to weigh the various interests of the
voters with the interests of the state. 10 3 Importantly, the balancing test
applied to laws that burdened voters, not just candidates. 104 Clearly, a
requirement that a state law meet a "compelling state interest" was absent from the Anderson scheme.' 0 5
However, the Court changed its tune once again (back to a fundamental rights approach), when it considered a law regulating political
Elmendorf, supra note 35. Here, I do not criticize the severe burden test itself but instead
question its very existence for analyzing a right that purportedly is fundamental.
101 See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782-83.
102

Id. at 789.

See id.
Id. at 806 ("We began our inquiry by noting that our primary concern is not the interest of candidate Anderson, but rather, the interests of the voters who chose to associate together to express their support for Anderson's candidacy and the views he espoused.").
105 The Court struck down the law in Anderson based on this balancing test because the
law placed a "particular burden on an identifiable segment of Ohio's independent-minded voters." Id. at 792, 806; see also Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986)
(upholding a state law that required a candidate to receive at least one percent of the vote in the
primary to include the candidate's name on the general election ballot); Am. Party of Tex. v.
White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 (1974) (upholding a one-percent petition-signature requirement, because "the State's admittedly vital interests are sufficiently implicated to insist that political
parties appearing on the general ballot demonstrate a significant, measurable quantum of community support" (citation omitted)).
103

104
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parties. In Tashjian v. Republican Party, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute mandating a "closed" primary system under the First
Amendment, because the statute violated a political party's right to freedom of association.10 6 The Court noted that the law also implicated the
constitutional right to vote, stating that "[t]he power to regulate the time,
place, and manner of elections does not justify, without more, the abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote."' 1 7 However, in
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, the Court determined that even
though the law in question imposed a burden on a party's access to the
ballot and its associational rights, the burden was not "severe" and could
be analyzed under a lower standard. 10 8 Similarly, the Court ruled in
Clingman v. Beaver that an Oklahoma law that provided for a "semiclosed" primary system burdened voters' rights only "minimally."' ° 9 The
Court reiterated that "not every electoral law that burdens associational
rights is subject to strict scrutiny."" 0 Instead, the Court upheld
Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system because the state presented "important regulatory interests," such as preserving political parties as viable
interest groups and deterring party raiding and "sore loser"
candidacies. "'
In sum, in cases involving access to the ballot or regulating political
parties, the Court sometimes uses a fundamental rights approach and alternatively uses a lower level of scrutiny.
3.

One Person-One Vote

The Court has had a tremendous impact on the layout of electoral
2
maps by decreeing that every person's vote must be "worth" the same. 1
The Court first explicitly applied a fundamental rights rationale for voting rights in Wesberry v. Sanders 1 3 and Reynolds v. Sims,1 14 both of
which involved the apportionment of seats in legislative districts. In
these cases, the Court sought to ensure that elections were fair by requiring states to value each person's vote the same through equally populated
106 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 229 (1986).
107 Id. at 217; see also Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222

(1989) (noting that a law that burdens the rights of political parties must survive strict scrutiny
review).
108 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363-64 (1997).
109 Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 590 (2005).
110 Id. at 592.
111 Id. at 593-94.
112 See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Election Law and the Roberts Court: Redistricting:
Race, Redistricting, and Representation,68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1185, 1202 (2007).
113 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
114 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In 1963, the Court noted that "once the class
of voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which
equality of voting power may be evaded," Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963), but at
that point the Court had still not explicitly defined the right to vote as a fundamental right.

2008]

Is

THE RIGHT TO VOTE REALLY FUNDAMENTAL?

electoral districts. 1 5 Demonstrating the importance of the right involved, the Court used particularly strong language in Wesberry:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the
laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to
vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room
for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily
16
abridges this right.'
Similarly, in Reynolds, the Court analyzed the apportionment of
seats in the Alabama legislature and stated that "[u]ndoubtedly, the right

of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society." '

17

In contrast, Bush v. GoreI I8 -perhaps the most famous election law
case involving the "worth" of one's vote-did not take this same categorical fundamental rights approach to the right to vote.' 19 This case
considered whether Florida's recount procedure gave equal weight to
each vote cast in the presidential election, which, at its core, is the same
question presented in Wesberry and Reynolds: did the state's election
regulation and recount procedure value every vote equally? 20 To be
12
sure, the Court used the words "fundamental right" in its decision. '
However, the Court was careful not to define the right to vote as categor122
Most
ically fundamental, even though it cited Reynolds several times.
importantly, the Court did not apply the same form of strict scrutiny as it
23
did in Wesberry and Reynolds, instead using a more relaxed standard.
115 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17-18.
116 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17-18.
117 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62. The Court continued, "Especially since the right to
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized" because "the right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is
of the essence of a democratic society." Id. at 555, 561-62. One commentator opined that
after Wesberry and Reynolds, "it may be appropriate to treat the right to vote as a supreme
value in this nation." Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential
but Unanalyzed Term in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 957 (1988).
118 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
119 For a discussion of the constitutionality and practical effects of Bush v. Gore, see
Michael J.Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1721, 1728 (2001).
120 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 105 (stating that the recount had to be "consistent with [the]
obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of [Florida's] electorate").
121 Id. at 104 ("When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its
fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed
to each voter.").
122 Id. at 105, 125.
123 See Elmendorf, supra note 35, at 331 n.66 (arguing that the Court used "rational basis
plus" review in Bush v. Gore); Hasen, supra note 32, at 389 (arguing that the Court did not
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Bush v. Gore thus exemplifies an important shift in how the Court now
approaches cases that consider the way in which states value or count
each vote: the Court no longer views the right to vote as always fundamental in this context.
Of course, there are many ways to reconcile Bush v. Gore with the
one person-one vote cases. For example, Wesberry and Reynolds involved the apportionment of legislative districts before an election, not
how to count the votes after a statewide election that would decide the
presidency.' 24 Nevertheless, if the Court strives to achieve consistency
and adhere to precedent, its failure to make a clear statement in Bush v.
Gore that the right to vote is a fundamental right is surprising given that
the case involved the same basic principles as these previous cases. The
facts may have been different, but the key issue was the same-what
procedures may a state use to ensure that every person has an equal say
in the outcome of an election? Bush v. Gore thus shows that the right to
vote, while once viewed as a fundamental right, no longer enjoys this
same status.

12 5

The foregoing demonstrates that even though the Court has declared
the right to vote to be a fundamental right, the Court approaches election
law disputes in various ways. For some cases, the Court will invoke the
severe burden test, decide that a state election law imposes a burden that
is less than severe, and employ a standard that is lower than strict scrutiny. 126 As another variation, in Crawford, the controlling opinion employed some form of balancing from the outset.12 7 Interestingly, in these
cases, the Court rarely bothers to discuss the right to vote as afundamental right, never even using these words. Instead, the Court's focus is
typically on the state's "reasonable" (i.e., less than compelling) interests.
However, in other cases, the Court uses the language of fundamental
really undertake a thorough strict scrutiny analysis and that the case should not be understood
as expanding the equal protection inquiry for a voting rights claim); see also Steven J. Mulroy,
Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v. Gore into a Vehicle for Reform?, 9
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 357, 375-76 (2002):
On balance, given the Court's discussion of the 'fundamental' nature of the right and its references to Harperand Reynolds, the opinion on Bush seems more oriented toward a strict scrutiny approach, at least where non-presidential elections are involved. This conclusion about
strict scrutiny is by no means clear-cut, however, as is indicated by other voting rights cases
decided by the Supreme Court.

Id. at 375.
124 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1964).
125 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363-64 (1997);

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992).
127 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615-16 (2008).
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rights jurisprudence and applies strict scrutiny review.' 28 This dichotomy holds true for most of the major areas of election law, including
cases involving who can vote, who can be a candidate, and how much
one's vote is worth.
Cases using a non-fundamental rights approach occur virtually in
tandem with the Court's fundamental rights election law decisions. For
example, in 1986, on the very same day, the Court in Tashjian analyzed
whether the state had demonstrated a compelling interest for imposing a
"closed" primary system, 129 while the Court in Munro required only a
"reasonable" justification for a law limiting who could appear on the
general election ballot. 130 The Court stated in Tashjian that "[t]he power
to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections does not justify,
without more, the abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to
vote."' 131 However, in Munro, the Court noted that "[l]egislatures .. .
should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral
process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that the response
is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights."' 132 The Court in Tashjian identified the right to vote as a
"fundamental right,"'133 while the words "fundamental right" appear in
Munro only in the dissent. 134 In short, the Court has left an election law
doctrine that is confused and muddled, providing little guidance to the
lower courts on which approach is appropriate.
II.

POTENTIAL REASONS FOR THE COURT'S INCONSISTENCY IN
ELECTION LAW CASES

Perhaps there is a principled reason for the Court's dual line of election law cases. Indeed, one might surmise that the analysis in the previous Part is not alarming because there is likely a pattern to when the
Court uses a fundamental-rights-plus-strict-scrutiny approach versus a
lower standard. This Part posits several theories to make sense of the
128 See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 229 (1986); Reynolds,
377 U.S. 533.
129 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217.
130 Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1986). Tashjian analyzed
Connecticut's closed primary system that allowed only registered members of a party to vote
in that party's primary, using a First Amendment right to association framework to invalidate
the law. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 210-13. Munro upheld Washington's statute that limited placement of candidates on the general election ballot to those who had received more than one
percent of the vote in the primary. Munro, 479 U.S. at 190-93. Thus, both cases dealt with
voters' ability to cast a ballot for a particular candidate or party, and the Court did not attempt
to distinguish them; neither majority opinion mentioned the other.
131 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added).
132 Munro, 479 U.S. at 195-96 (emphasis added).
133 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217.
134 Munro, 479 U.S. at 200 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Court's differing treatment of election law cases but concludes that none
fully explain the Court's decisions. This Part therefore provides the
foundation for Part IV, which suggests a way for the Court to rethink its
approach to election law cases.
A.

Individual Rights Versus Ballot Access

One potential way to distinguish cases that employ a fundamental
rights approach from cases that use a lower level of scrutiny is to discern
whose rights the law under review allegedly infringes. There may be a
key distinction between laws that regulate an individual's right to vote
and laws that determine a candidate's eligibility to appear on the ballot.1 35 Many of the Supreme Court cases discussed in the previous Part
mirror this understanding. For example, Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections dealt with a poll tax that directly restricted a citizen's right to
vote, and the Court identified the right at stake as a "fundamental right"
and struck down the law under strict scrutiny review. 136 Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15, another fundamental-rights-plusstrict-scrutiny case, analyzed a law that limited which individuals could
vote in a school district's elections.1 37 In Burson v. Freeman, the Court
upheld a law restricting advertising around a polling place because the
law burdened the ability of individual voters to exercise their fundamen138
tal right to vote.
In the same way, many of the cases where the Court used a lower
level of scrutiny involved access to the ballot. In Storer v. Brown, a
ballot access case, the Court stated that "[i]t is very unlikely that all or
even a large portion of the state election laws would fail to pass muster
under our cases. 139 The Court's "balancing of the interests" test came
about in Anderson v. Celebrezze, which dealt with an independent party
candidate's attempt to be placed on the ballot.1 40 The same is true for
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, which used a lower level of scrutiny
to analyze a restriction on who could appear on the general election

ballot. 141
However, while it may be convenient to believe that the Court's
election law jurisprudence is predicated on whether the law burdens individual voters or candidates, the Court itself has explicitly rejected this
view. In Bullock v. Carter,a ballot access case, the Court stated that "the
135
IV.A.1.
136
137
138
139
140
141

Indeed, this Article expressly advocates invoking that distinction. See infra Part
See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 670 (1966).
See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 30 (1974).
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789-90 (1983).
See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1986).
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rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to
neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some
theoretical, correlative effect on voters." 14 2 The Court's cases also reflect this lack of a clear separation. The Court has employed a fundamental-rights-plus-strict-scrutiny analysis for some ballot access cases 43 and
has used a lower level of scrutiny for cases that involve only otherwiseeligible citizens' right to cast a vote. 1' In fact, the Court promulgated
the severe burden test and used a lower level of scrutiny in Burdick v.
Takushi, a case involving Hawaii's ban on an individual voter writing in
a candidate of the voter's choice on the ballot. The Court used a lower
level of scrutiny in Burdick because it estimated that the law imposed
only a minimal burden on the individual right to vote.145 The same was
true in Crawford, where the Court analyzed a law that directly burdened
voters-requiring them to show a photo identification to vote-and employed merely some form of a balancing test.' 4 6 If the Court actually
reviewed laws about individual voters under strict scrutiny and laws regulating candidates or political parties under a lower level of scrutiny,
then the Court should have used strict scrutiny in both Burdick and
Crawford, which were cases about restrictions on individual voters.
B.

Content-based Versus Content-neutralLaws

Another possible explanation for the differing approaches is the
content of the law under review. Perhaps laws that regulate voting rights
based on the particular content of the voters' or political parties' expression or that invidiously discriminate require strict scrutiny review, while
147 Almost
content-neutral laws warrant analysis under a lower standard.
twenty years ago, Professor Tribe took a similar view:
Constitutional review of election and campaign regulation amounts, in large part, to accommodating the fear of
a temporary majority entrenching itself with the necessity of making the election a readable barometer of the
electorate's preferences. It is not surprising, therefore,
142

Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).

143 See, e.g., Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989); Ill.

State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1979); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
144 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992); Rosario v. Rockefeller,
410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973).
145 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
146 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623-24 (2008).
147 See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438 (stating that "there is nothing content based about a
flat ban on all forms of write-in ballots"); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983)
(stating that "it is especially difficult for the State to justify a restriction that limits political
participation by an identifiable political group whose members share a particular viewpoint,
associational preference, or economic status").
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that the vigor of judicial review of election laws has
been roughly proportioned to their potential for immunizing the current leadership from successful attack. 148
However, this reasoning has two general flaws. First, if this is really the Court's approach in election law cases-sorting the laws that
infringe upon voters' rights based on the particular content of the law or
the manner in which it entrenches the majority from the laws that simply
regulate the voting process for the entire electorate-then the Court's
competing approaches to election law cases are a cryptic and inapt means
of achieving this goal. If there is a meaningful difference between election laws that are content-based and those that are content-neutral, and if
the level of scrutiny in these cases is dependent on that difference, then
we would expect the Court to make this distinction far more explicitly.
Second, many of the Court's cases contradict this understanding.
While it is true that many laws that the Court has reviewed under strict
scrutiny involved content-based regulations that tended to entrench majority parties,1 49 there are significant cases that do not follow this pattern.
For example, although the law restricting advertising near the polls in
Burson v. Freeman impacted all voters equally and had nothing to do
with entrenching the majority, the Court used a fundamental rights approach.' 5 0 More tellingly, several of the court's non-fundamental rights
election law cases did involve content-based laws that might have tended
to entrench the majority. In Storer v. Brown, the Court used a lower
level of scrutiny to analyze a ballot access law that required disaffiliation
with a prior party for one year before the primary to be placed on the
ballot as an independent.' 5 ' This type of law was content-based because
it affected only candidates who decided to become independents too soon
before the primary. Furthermore, the law tended to help majority parties
remain in the majority, because their candidates would face less opposition, as the law made it harder for factions to break off from entrenched
parties. Nevertheless, the Court used a lower level of scrutiny because
the law did not impose a "severe burden" on voting rights. The same
analysis rings true when dissecting Burdick, which used a lower level of
scrutiny to uphold Hawaii's write-in ban-even though that system
helped to entrench the leadership by foreclosing last-minute write-in
148 TRIBE, supra note 16, at 1097; see also League of Women Voters v. Diamond, 965 F.
Supp. 96, 101 (D. Me. 1997).
149 See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) ("No extended discussion is

required to establish that the Ohio laws before us give the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new parties struggling for existence and thus place substantially
unequal burdens on both the right to vote and the fight to associate.").
150 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199-200 (1992).
151 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728-33 (1974).
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campaigns from outsiders.1 52 Thus, while some cases follow the content-based-versus-content-neutral-or "entrenchment"-pattem, this distinction neither provides a satisfying explanation for the Court's actions
nor accurately describes what the Court has done in all of its election law
cases.
It is also incorrect to say that the Court uses strict scrutiny only to
evaluate a law that discriminates against a suspect class and a lower level
of scrutiny for all other cases. A law that invidiously discriminates is, by
definition, a content-based law, and the Court has generally used strict
scrutiny for these types of claims.' 5 3 However, the Court has used strict
scrutiny for a slew of other election laws that have nothing to do with
invidious discrimination, such as laws limiting voter eligibility to property owners or laws creating different signature requirements for ballot
access. 154 The Court's decision in Burdick, which purportedly delineated
when to use strict scrutiny, referred simply to "burdens"-not "burdens
that invidiously discriminate"-to define the scope of the severe burden
test. 155 Furthermore, the Voting Rights Act provides a statutory mechanism for voters who are minorities to vindicate their rights, suggesting
that this factor may not always be prevalent in a pure constitutional challenge to an election regulation.' 56 Thus, attempting to reconcile the
Court's election law cases by determining which laws are content-based
as opposed to content-neutral or which laws invidiously discriminate
against certain people leads to no principled explanation of the Court's
election law jurisprudence. Simply put, this mode of analysis would be
impossible to define, measure, or predict. It also fails to accurately reflect what the Court has done in all election law cases.
C. Direct Versus Indirect Burdens Pursuant to the State's Power to
Regulate the Times, Places, and Manner of an Election
Perhaps there is a difference between laws that directly burden an
individual's right to vote and laws that indirectly burden that right by
regulating some other part of the election process.' 57 After all, states
have a constitutional obligation to dictate the "times, places, and manU.S. at 434, 436-37.
153 See, e.g., Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970). The law in Evans did not deal
with a suspect class, but the Court still noted that the law invidiously discriminated against a
certain class of voters. Id. at 426; see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
154 See, e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 175-77
(1979); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
155 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
156 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
157 See, e.g., Brief of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party [Applicable Legal Standard] at 3-9, Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, Nos. 0721, 07-25, (U.S. Apr. 28, 2008), availableat http://brennancenter.orgldynamic/subpages/down
load file_50861.pdf (explicitly adopting this solution); see also infra Part IV.A.1.
152 Burdick, 504
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ner" of holding elections; 158 perhaps laws enacted pursuant to that duty
warrant a lower level of scrutiny. For example, the Court has used a
lower level of scrutiny in ballot access cases, such as Storer v. Brown,
demonstrating that a lower standard can be appropriate for a law that
defines how to run an election and only indirectly burdens individual
voters. 159 By contrast, Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15
involved a state statute that directly limited who could vote in a particular election, making it a direct burden on voting rights that was separate
from regulating the times, places, and manner of holding an election. 160
161
The Court applied strict scrutiny review.
However, this rationale does not explain many cases under the
Court's election law jurisprudence. For example, in Rosario v. Rockefeller, the Court used a lower level of scrutiny to analyze a law that had
little to do with regulating the times, places, or manner of holding an
election. 162 Instead, the law restricted certain voters from participating
in a primary unless they had enrolled in the party of their choice over a
year in advance. 163 This law therefore directly burdened individuals'
right to vote in the election unless they met particular criteria, did not
directly affect candidates or political parties, and did not regulate the
structure of the election itself. 164 Similarly, the Court used strict scrutiny
to analyze California's scheme of regulating the internal operation of political parties, which did not directly burden voters, 165 and it used strict
scrutiny to strike down a law that dealt with the "manner" of an election-the signature requirements for appearing on the ballot.' 66
Even more telling is that lower courts do not follow this distinction
in their election law cases. For example, consider a state statute that
prohibited candidates not affiliated with a political party from placing the
word "Independent" next to the candidate's name on the ballot. The
Fifth Circuit held that this kind of law, in Louisiana, imposed only a
"minor, indirect, and remote" burden on the candidate's supporters, and
158 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.

159 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729-30 (1974); see also Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986).
160 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969).
161 Id. at 629-30.
162 See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1973).
163 Id. at 754. Construing this case as analyzing a law regarding the "manner" of an
election would make it difficult to distinguish any law that infringes on the right to vote from a
law that merely regulates the "manner" of holding an election.
164 I do not mean to suggest that the state did not have a compelling reason for imposing
the law or that the law was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's goal. The example
merely shows that the Court does not review all laws that directly burden voters' rights under
strict scrutiny.
165 See Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989).
166 See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 175-77,
183-88 (1979).
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used a lower level of scrutiny.1 67 However, the Sixth Circuit held that
the same type of law in Ohio impaired the ability to cast a meaningful
vote or to associate meaningfully, and invalidated the law under strict
scrutiny.' 68 Similarly, at least two courts have used strict scrutiny to
analyze a challenge to the layout of a ballot, which seemingly relates to
169
the state's power to regulate the manner of an election.
Thus, whether a state enacts a law pursuant to its constitutional obligation or whether a law directly or indirectly burdens a voter's ability to
cast a ballot does not necessarily impact the choice of the level of scrutiny. Although this rationale might explain some of the cases in the election law area, it does not provide a comprehensive explanation or an
accurate predictive tool for the Court's overall jurisprudence.
The foregoing discussion suggests that currently there may be no
principled reason for the Court's vacillation between strict scrutiny and a
lower level of review in election law cases. Of course, the same law
could impose different burdens in one state versus another, leading to
inconsistent approaches for the exact same law and a dichotomy in how
courts analyze a so-called fundamental right. Perhaps the Court is not
seeking to achieve consistency when handling difficult cases involving
an upcoming election. Perhaps the political motivations of the Justices
are involved in each decision, leading to a dual line of cases depending
on the specific facts of each case.t 70 Perhaps the Justices believe that
election law cases simply fall on a continuum that, for whatever reason,
forecloses consistency between decisions.' 7 ' Or perhaps there is simply
See Dart v. Brown, 717 F.2d 1491, 1499-1504 (5th Cir. 1983).
See Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 175-76 (6th Cir. 1992).
See Graves v. McElderry, 946 F. Supp. 1569, 1578-79 (W.D. Okla. 1996); Devine v.
Island, 827 F. Supp. 852, 861-62 (D.R.I. 1993).
170 See generally TERRI JENNINGS PERETrI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 77-132
(1999) (arguing that having Supreme Court Justices decide cases based in part upon political
motivations is both unavoidable and normatively desirable); see also Robert Barnes, Partisan
Fissuresover Voter ID: Justices to Hear Challenge to Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2007, at Al
(quoting Professor Hasen as arguing that in the voter identification context, judges' decisions
demonstrate a "philosophical divide on the question of whether protecting the integrity of the
voting process from fraud is of equal or greater value than making sure as many eligible voters
as possible take part in the process").
171 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1628 (2008)
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("Given the legitimacy of interests on both sides, we have avoided preset levels of scrutiny in favor of a sliding-scale balancing analysis."). As Justice O'Connor
noted in Clingmian v. Beaver:
Where the State imposes only reasonable and genuinely neutral restrictions on associational
rights, there is no threat to the integrity of the electoral process and no apparent reason for
judicial intervention. As such restrictions become more severe, however, and particularly
where they have discriminatory effects, there is increasing cause for concern that those in
power may be using electoral rules to erect barriers to electoral competition. In such cases,
applying heightened scrutiny helps to ensure that such limitations are truly justified and that
the State's asserted interests are not merely a pretext for exclusionary or anticompetitive
restrictions.
167
168
169
Rhode
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no adequate principle to sort out the Court's dual line of election law
cases, because the Court alters its level of scrutiny for each case to ensure states can effectively regulate an election. The problem, however, is
that predicting when the Court will use one approach or the other is exceedingly difficult. Additionally, as discussed below, the Court's election law jurisprudence leaves litigants and lower courts guessing as to the
appropriate level of scrutiny and derogates the right to vote as less than
fundamental in some circumstances.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S FRACTURED APPROACH

TO ELECTION LAW CASES

The Supreme Court's co-existing dual line of cases-one always
applying strict scrutiny because the right to vote is fundamental, the other
balancing the burdens the election law imposes with the state's legitimate
interests-results in many negative consequences.
The most practical implication is the widespread confusion among
the lower courts. A California district court recognized this inconsistency: "The Supreme Court ... has not clearly articulated the level of

scrutiny which courts are to give to alleged infringements of the fundamental right to vote. .

.

. Thus, at some times Reynolds seems to be

adopting a strict scrutiny standard while at other [times] the standard
seems to be more lenient."1 72 The Eleventh Circuit remarked that although "[t]he right to vote is fundamental, .

.

. states are entitled to bur-

den that right to ensure that elections are fair, honest and efficient."' 173
Of course, the court did not explain why a fundamental right, which
would normally require strict scrutiny review, should instead be reviewed under a lower standard in determining whether the state is impermissibly burdening that right. Similarly, the First Circuit recognized that
"[t]he standard of review for a law that burdens ballot access and voting
rights is not static; rather, the Supreme Court has suggested something of
a sliding scale approach and has noted that there is no 'bright line' to
separate unconstitutional state election laws from constitutional ones." 1 74
But the Court has not actually provided a clear explanation of that sliding
scale; if the Court had articulated what factors define where a given case
falls on a purported scale, then there would be less cause for concern, but
because the Court has not done so, the results are arbitrary or easily
manipulated.
544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
172 Common Cause S. Christian Leadership Conference of Greater L.A. v. Jones, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 1106, 1108-09 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
173 Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1232 (11th Cir. 2006).
174 McClure v. Galvin, 386 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Werme v. Merrill, 84
F.3d 479, 483 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme Court has eschewed a hard-and-fast rule, and
instead has adopted a flexible framework for testing the validity of election regulations.").
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Indeed, lower courts have varied in how they have approached election law claims. For example, appellate courts have differed in what
level of scrutiny to use for challenges to new voting machines in the
wake of the 2000 election. 175 In Stewart v. Blackwell, the Sixth Circuit
held that Ohio's punch card ballots and optical scan systems were unconstitutional under strict scrutiny review. 176 The holding reflected the majority's determination that the machines placed a heavy burden on the
electorate's ability to cast a vote. 17 7 In contrast, the dissent relied on
Burdick: "This challenge to the nuts-and-bolts of election administration,
regardless of its merit, cannot be equated with either discriminatory
voter-qualification requirements or generally applicable state laws that
deny 'equality of voting power,' ... which are the principal types of state
actions that the Supreme Court has subjected to strict scrutiny."' 17 8 The
Ninth Circuit held the opposite on virtually the same issue. 17 9 In Weber
v. Shelley, the court analyzed a voter's challenge to California's plan to
replace paper ballots with an electronic voter system under a lower level
of scrutiny. 180 The court reviewed the law using Burdick because the
"use of paperless, touchscreen voting systems [does not] severely restrict[ ] the right to vote."''
Voter identification cases provide another example of the confusion
regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny for election law disputes. 182
In Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, the Northern District of Georgia
determined that a law requiring voters to show photo identification at the
polls-at least for that upcoming election-imposed a severe burden on
voters who did not have proper identification, therefore warranting strict
scrutiny review. 1 83 However, the district court in Gonzalez v. Arizona
disagreed, stating that a requirement that voters show identification when
registering to vote and arriving at a polling site would affect "less than
175 See Demian A. Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a
Standard That Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1174, 1192-95 (2007).
176 Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 861-62 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot en banc
by 473 F.3d 692, 694 (6th Cir. 2007) (becoming moot when Ohio abandoned its desire to use

the challenged machines).
Id.
178 Id. at 883 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
177

179 Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003).

Id.
Id. Professor Daniel Tokaji discerns a reconciling principle between cases such as
Weber, Stewart, and Wexler. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On Judicial
Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIo Sr. L.J. 1065, 1077-78 (2007) (suggesting
that the differences in the cases stem from different empirical evidence involving particular
180
181

voting machines).
182

See generally Overton, supra note 31 (providing an in-depth analysis of photo identifi-

cation requirements).
183

Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2006).

172

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18:143

18 4
3% of the voting population" and therefore was not a "severe" burden.
In ACLU v. Santillanes, the court determined that a new city ordinance
requiring voters to show identification at the polls imposed a severe burden, 185 while the Seventh Circuit's decision in Crawford determined that
a photo identification requirement did not impose a severe burden and
that strict scrutiny was inapplicable to this issue.' 8 6 Judge Wood, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc at the Seventh Circuit, noted
that "the panel's opinion in this case addresses an exceptionally important unresolved question of law: what level of scrutiny should courts use
when evaluating mandatory voter identification laws?"' 8 7 The litigants
in Crawford spent considerable time debating the proper level of scrutiny, and several law professors wrote amicus briefs to the Supreme
188
Court solely on this topic.

However, instead of answering this question, the Supreme Court in
Crawford injected even more confusion into this issue.' 8 9 Generally
speaking, Crawford determined that voter identification cases require a
balancing analysis of the various interests at stake. 190 But the lead opinion in Crawford also left open the door for voters to bring as-applied
challenges, suggesting that the burden of a photo identification law might
be severe enough to warrant a higher level of scrutiny-or at least significant enough to make a law unconstitutional even under a lower level of
scrutiny. 1 9 ' Although a balancing test might make theoretical sense, its
application becomes difficult when there are few standards for how to
apply it.192 Unfortunately, the Court did not provide any additional guidance, beyond balancing the actual burdens the voters claimed and the
interests the state set forth for that particular law. Given the lead opinion's fact-specific analysis of Indiana's photo identification law, it will
be difficult for lower courts to glean any guiding principles from Crawford, even for voter identification cases. Further, the Court once again
failed to recognize that part of its election law jurisprudence includes the
concept that the right to vote is a fundamental right, never even using this
phrase in either the lead or concurring opinions.
184 Gonzalez v. Arizona, No. CV 06-1268-PHX-ROS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76638, at
*27-28 (D. Ariz. Oct. 11, 2006), affd, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 9125 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2007).
185 ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598, 633 (D.N.M. 2007).
186 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007).
187 Id. at 437 (Wood, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
188 See supra note 157.
189 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
190 Id. at 1616 (stating that the burden imposed by a state must "be justified by relevant
and legitimate state interests 'sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation"').
191 Id. at 1621-22.

192 A recent district court case demonstrated the difficulties inherent in discerning the
proper approach stemming from Crawford. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No.
C 06-4670, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69542, at *46-49 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008).
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With a lack of guidance, lower courts have attempted to create their
own distinctions for when to use one level of scrutiny or the other. In
Donatelli v. Mitchell, the Third Circuit opined that laws that permanently
deny access to the franchise deserve strict scrutiny review, while laws
that only temporarily infringe on the right to vote require rational basis.193 In Mixon v. Ohio, the Sixth Circuit articulated its understanding
of Supreme Court law by stating that state election regulations that
"grant[ ] the right to vote to some residents while denying the vote to
others" are subject to strict scrutiny, while rational basis is appropriate
for legislation that "does not infringe on the right to vote."1 94
This divergence in approaches demonstrates that one positive result
of adopting a consistent rule for election law disputes is that the Court
can streamline litigation in the lower courts. As the next Part demonstrates, the Court will save judicial resources by declaring that an individual's right to vote is always a fundamental right that requires a specific
mode of strict scrutiny review, but that laws that do not directly affect
voters are not about a fundamental right. Thus, lower courts can more
easily dispose of election law cases without spending considerable time
merely trying to figure out which level of scrutiny is most appropriate for
that situation. In this way, the court can focus on the merits of the dispute instead of the framework with which to evaluate it. As discussed
above, the Court basically punted on this issue in Crawford. But the
solution should not be limited to voter identification cases: the Court
should clear this up for all election law disputes involving individual
voters, so lower courts can focus on the substance of these cases. 195 This
is particularly important for last-minute voter challenges, which a court
must decide quickly before an election takes place. 196
Another negative implication of the Court's dual approach to election law cases is that the Court has sent the message that the right to vote
should not be cherished as a basic Constitutional protection or a right that
193 Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 514 (3d Cir. 1993).
194 Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1999).
195 Cf.Brett W. King, DeconstructingGordon and Contingent Legislative Authority: The
Constitutionalityof SupermajorityRules, 6 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 133, 163-64 (1999)
(noting that lower courts have remained confused about the correct level of scrutiny for cases
involving a state's constitutionally-mandated supermajority requirement for approving certain
ballot initiatives in light of Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971)).
196 See, e.g., Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388
F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2004) (deciding a voter's last-minute challenge to an Ohio law allowing partisan challengers at the polling places). Indeed, in Summit County, one judge believed the court should use a lower standard because the law did not impose a severe burden,
id., one judge concurred for a procedural reason, id. (Ryan, J.,
concurring), and the dissenting
judge would have used strict scrutiny, id. at 552 (Cole, J., dissenting). A clear declaration that
the individual right to vote is fundamental and requires strict scrutiny review would have
eliminated this confusion, because the law directly impacted voters' experiences at the polls by
allowing challengers to question their eligibility.
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is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 197 If it is true that the
Court will not "pick out particular human activities, characterize them as
'fundamental,' and give them added protection" but instead will simply
"recognize[ ], as it must, an established constitutional right, and give[ ] to
that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands," 198 then
the Court's inconsistent treatment of whether the right to vote is a fundamental right is particularly curious. Every time the Court uses a standard
less than strict scrutiny to review an election law that directly burdens
individuals, it sends the signal that an individual's right to vote is not a
fundamental right. 199
The Court's approach also raises other, more practical questions.
Might some voters choose not to challenge a particular state law because
they believe the Court will use a lower level of scrutiny to make a bold
statement upholding the law? Are state lawmakers overzealous in regulating elections based on the Court's differing treatment of the right to
vote? Does the Court's approach to an individual's right to vote as
sometimes less than fundamental send the wrong signal to society and
contribute to voter apathy and low turnout rates? 2°° Obviously, these

effects are merely speculative, as they are difficult to define or measure.
But the Court's fractured methodology raises these questions, which
demonstrates that the Court's differing treatment of the right to vote has
far-reaching implications. In short, the Court's different approaches
have produced unintended consequences, creating serious ramifications
for the operation of our representative democracy by undermining the
importance of the right to vote.
Thus, having a consistent approach will help to elevate the stature of
the right to vote. By always treating the right to vote as a fundamental
197 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (using this phrase in the
substantive due process context).
198 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
199 Professor Foley, in an online debate, expressed the importance of the message the
Court sends when evaluating a claim for equal voting rights:
[W]hatever the full panoply of individual rights that is necessary for any democratic
process to be fair, equal voting rights for all adult citizens surely would be included.
Equal voting rights are a prerequisite to democratic fairness not only for their instrumental value, which is most readily apparent when likeminded citizens pool their
equal voting rights to prevail under majority rule; but also, equal voting rights are an
essential ingredient to democratic fairness for the additional symbolic-but no less
important-reason that they signify the equality of citizenship upon which democratic fairness depends.
Bradley A. Smith & Edward B. Foley, Voter ID: What's at Stake?, 156 U. PA. L. REV.PENNUMBRA 241, 249 (2007), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/voterid.pdf.
200 See Jeffrey A. Blomberg, Protecting the Right Not to Vote from Voter Purge Statutes,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1995) (citing voter apathy as an important factor in low
voter turnout).
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right when a law directly burdens voters, the Court will signal that a state
may infringe on the right only pursuant to its obligation to regulate elections. 20 ' Society puts particular importance on those rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. ' 202 By vacillating between levels
of scrutiny in the voting rights context, the Court has sent a signal that
the right to vote is not as important as other fundamental rights. Perhaps
this is because the state has a special role in regulating elections or because some parties or candidates have more to gain by attempting to
disenfranchise the other sides' supporters through election regulation. 20 3
Regardless, the way the Court analyzes the right to vote has particular
significance on the way society values the right. 2°4 Why should the right
to vote be less important than, say, the right to interstate travel, which
receives consistent treatment as a fundamental right? 205 Declaring that
the individual right to vote is always fundamental will go a long way
toward elevating the importance of the right in the social fabric of our
culture.

IV. A

NEW APPROACH TO ELECTION LAW DISPUTES

It is possible for the Court to provide consistency in its election law
cases and still remain faithful to its precedents. The solution is twofold:
first, the Court should redefine what it means to have a fundamental right
to vote, recognizing that the right involved, when considered fundamental, is really an individual right. That is, the Court should employ the
language of fundamental rights only when the law under review has the
predominate effect of directly burdening individual voters. Second, for
201 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Under the Bridges of Paris: Economic Liberties Should Not
Be Just for the Rich, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 31, 32 (2003) (stating that "[p]olitical and civil rights
and liberties-free speech, privacy, voting, and so on-are properly regarded as fundamental
rights because of their importance to personhood and for society").
202 Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
203 See Samuel Issacharoff et al., LAW OF DEMOCRACY 64 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2005) (recognizing "the always present risk that election regulations enacted by self-interested legislatures can be a vehicle for incumbent or partisan protection"); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Early
Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement,and the Help America Vote Act,
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1248 (2005) (suggesting that local election administrators may
apply rules that benefit their preferred candidate or hurt the candidates they oppose).
204 See Kenneth L. Karst, ConstitutionalEquality as a CulturalForm: The Courts and the
Meanings of Sex and Gender, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 513, 513-14 (2003) (arguing that
"substantive outcomes in our courts can also be seen as cultural forms, functioning in a relation of mutual influence with other cultural forms in American society" and that "our courts
have themselves contributed to the process" of cultural change).
205 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999); Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250, 254 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 628, 629-30 (1969); see also
Christopher S. Maynard, Nine Headed Caesar: The Supreme Court's Thumbs-Up Approach to
the Right to Travel, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 330 (2000) (stating that "the Court has
justified a heightened level of scrutiny by declaring the right to travel an implied fundamental
right").
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those laws that impact an individual fundamental right or impose a severe burden on voters (albeit indirectly), the Court should apply strict
scrutiny, but it should recalibrate the strict scrutiny test for election law
cases to recognize the unique stake that states have in regulating
elections.
A.

Redefining the "Fundamental" Right to Vote
1. Laws that Impact an Individual Right

The Court has first gone astray in failing to define precisely what
aspect of the right to vote is involved in its election law cases. Indeed,
while there is no reconciling principle in the cases, there should be. That
is, the Court should make a normative judgment about what parts of the
voting process belong to the individual as a fundamental right and what
aspects are instead tangential to an individual's act of voting. In some
ways, the Court's current approach demonstrates a desire to create a "one
size fits all" rule via the severe burden test. But voting is an extremely
complex act with many interrelated parts, not all of which are necessarily
part of the fundamental right.
A good starting place in defining the right to vote is to discern what
interests and stakeholders are involved in most election law disputes.
Then, by making a value judgment about the importance of those rights
vis a vis the other interests of the various stakeholders, we can determine
which aspects of the right to vote are so important as to be deemed fundamental because they are intrinsic to the foundations of our democracy
20 6
and to the goal of self-governance.
State election laws generally regulate three kinds of actors: individual voters, political parties, and candidates. Similarly, election law cases
typically pit at least one of these groups against the state. The basic
premise of this section is that when the Court speaks of the fundamental
right to vote, it should consider that right as it directly relates to individual voters. 20 7 Laws that directly burden individual voters' rights impli206 See Van Detta, supra note 27, at 219 n.21.

207 Some scholars have posited that the Court's election law jurisprudence demonstrates
that it really analyzes voting laws with a structural purpose and is mostly concerned with
aggregate effects. See, e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 35, at 322 (noting that the Court "seeks ...
to insure that the electoral system achieves or manifests certain properties in the aggregate
(such as adequate openness to change, political accountability, and participation by a full
cross-section of the citizenry)"); Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court,
Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 503, 523 (2004); Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic

Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 670-74 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The
Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L.

REv. 1345, 1346 (2001) ("The Court deploys the Equal Protection Clause not to protect the
rights of an identifiable group of individuals, particularly a group unable to protect itself
through operation of the normal political processes, but rather to regulate the institutional
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cate a fundamental right because these laws make distinctions about who
can vote or how voters actually cast their ballots, and thus go to the
foundations of political participation and democracy. At its core, voting
is an individual act. We go to the polls and cast our ballot for a particular candidate, and we expect that our vote will count toward electing
someone to office. Voting is perhaps the most important politically expressive activity that we undertake, because by voting, we indicate our
desire to have a particular person in a position of power. Our democracy
is founded upon the notion that every vote counts. For many people,
voting is extremely personal. While we need others' votes to elect someone to office, generally speaking, every person casts a ballot as an individual, and a single vote can tilt the outcome of an election. Further,
voting represents the most pure act of self-governance. By voting, each
person makes a personal choice about who best can represent his or her
interests in the government. Rights that are inherent in protecting individual autonomy and self-governance are properly construed as fundamental. 20 8 Thus, it makes sense to think of the fundamental right to vote
as an individual right.
This understanding comports with the Court's approach to other
fundamental rights. The right to marry is an individual right, not a collective right. 20 9 The same holds true for the right to procreate, 2 10 the

arrangements within which politics is conducted.") (citations omitted); Richard H. Pildes, The
Constitutionalizationof Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. Rav. 28, 44 (2004) (arguing that
the purpose of judicial supervision is to "address structural problems and enforce structural
values concerning the democratic order as a whole"). This viewpoint, however, creates the
very problem I identify in this Article, namely, that the Court necessarily derogates the importance of an individual's right to vote through this approach. Professor Guy-Uriel Charles
argues,
[E]lection law cases cannot be divided into neat categories along the individual
rights and structuralism divide. Election law cases raise both issues of individual
and structural rights. Therefore, the label attached to election law claims is immaterial. The fundamental questions are what are the values that judicial review ought to
vindicate and how best to vindicate those values. These are questions that transcend
the rights-structure divide.
Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 Micu. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2005). I take
a similar view on the structuralism/individual rights debate. Without wading too deeply into
that discussion, however, my argument is simply that when the Court defines the right to vote
as afundamental right, it should do so in an individual rights context. It follows that structuralism is still important for laws that directly touch other interests, such as those that regulate
political parties or candidates. Regardless, by precisely identifying the meaning of the phrase
"fundamental right to vote," the Court can untangle this confusion.
208 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937); TRIBE, supra note 16, at 770; Winkler, supra note 11, at 236.
209 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-85; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
210 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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right to interstate travel, 21 and the right to sexual privacy. 2 12 When the
Court speaks of these rights as fundamental, it construes the right with
respect to an individual who seeks to assert that right in the face of a law
that restricts that individual's actions. This is no different in the election
law context.
In contrast to laws that directly burden individual voters, laws that
regulate candidates or political parties are about electoral mechanics and
the structure of elections. These types of laws impact individual voters
only tangentially because they restrict someone other than the votersuch as a candidate or a political party. Further, the Constitution itself
explicitly gives states the power to regulate the elections of senators and
representatives with respect to the "times, places, and manner"-i.e., the
mechanics of holding an election. 2 13 To be sure, voters' rights are intertwined with the rights of other groups subject to laws about the structure
2 14 It
of an election, but these laws often do not directly burden voters.
therefore makes little sense to refer to a voter's right in this context as an
individual fundamental right. The upshot is that laws that directly impact
voters deserve strict scrutiny review because they regulate a fundamental
right, but the Court can continue to use the severe burden test for laws
2 15
that regulate political parties or candidates.
Voters' interests in election law disputes typically lie in their ability
to participate in our democracy, express their individual preferences,
make a political statement, or ensure that their votes are counted
211 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966).
212 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle,
517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008).
213 U.S. CONST. art.

I, § 4.

214 For example, a law that creates certain rules for political parties in the context of a
state's primary election does not directly affect how an individual voter interacts with the
electoral process, even if the law indirectly impacts voters through its regulation of political
parties. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1187
(2008).
215 This approach is significantly different from how Professor Elmendorf describes the
Court's current methodology. See Elmendorf, supra note 35, at 322, 336-37. Professor Elmendorf suggests that laws regulating "electoral mechanics" generally carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. Id. at 336. He notes, however, that an inspection of the formal
features of the law, informed by simple "proxies for impact," can reverse this presumption and
trigger strict scrutiny, with an eye toward preserving desirable structural features of election
law. Id. at 336, 344. Therefore, under the Court's current methodology, a law purportedly
regulating electoral mechanics-such as a ban on write-in voting-would likely enjoy relaxed
scrutiny even if it directly impacts voters' experiences at the polls. Thus, according to Professor Elmendorf's explanation, the Court does not take into account the types of burdens that
individual voters encounter, and it does not distinguish between the political actors (i.e., voter,
candidate, or political party) that an election law primarily targets. I believe that this omission
in the Court's current approach creates confusion over what it means to have a fundamental
right to vote.
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equally.2 16 These concepts can be thought of as the "foundation" of the
right to vote. As discussed above, laws that directly restrict or limit how
voters interact with the political process regulate an individual fundamental right. There are three categories of laws that fall into this group:
regulations that create a disparity regarding the value of one's vote, laws
that define who is eligible to vote, and laws that burden how voters are
treated at the polls.
A regulation that values one person's vote over another's patently
affects individual rights because that law makes distinctions between
particular voters. We all want our votes to count-and to count in the
same way as every other vote. The "one person-one vote" principle
helps to ensure the legitimacy of our democracy by reassuring voters that
the election results are an accurate portrayal of the majority's will and
that their leaders win elections to their offices fairly. Laws that draw
distinctions between voters regarding the value of their votes thereby affect their individual rights and call into question the accuracy of the elec7 The Supreme Court's
tion results and the efficacy of self-governance. a1218
"one person-one vote" cases-Gray v. Sanders, Reynolds v. Sims, 2 19
Moore v. Ogilvie,22 0 and even Bush v. Gore22 1-involved differential
treatment of voters by state apportionment mechanisms. 222 If all other
rights derive from the right to vote, then it makes sense that ensuring
216 For example, the plaintiffs in Crawford sought to ensure that they could participate in
the election even if they did not present a photo identification. See Crawford v. Marion
County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 (2008). The plaintiffs in Reynolds v. Sims, a one
person-one vote case, were concerned with the dilution of the value of their votes. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 540 (1964).
217 For example, many people questioned President Bush's legitimacy after the 2000 election because many voters believed that their votes were not counted. See Frank Emmert et al.,

Trouble Counting Votes? Comparing Voting Mechanisms in the United States and Selected
Other Countries, 41 CREIGHTON L. REv. 3, 3-4 (2007).

Legitimacy requires that governments conduct elections in a way that is objectively
fair and widely perceived as fair. Therefore, a central motivation for non-partisan
and uniform system of election administration is that every citizen, every voter, be
treated equally and have an equal opportunity to participate. The United States
frequently appears to fall short of these goals. The highest profile example of this
failure is the Florida vote in the 2000 presidential election. Michigan Representative
John Conyers stated, "[olur broken electoral system was an accomplice to a magic
trick that would make David Copperfield proud: millions of Americans went to vote
on November 7, 2000, only to have their voice in our democracy disappear."
Id. (alteration in original) (internal footnotes and quotation marks omitted).
218 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
219 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-56 (1964).
220 Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 815-16, 819 (1969).
221 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per curiam).
222

See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality,

and Participation,101

MICH.

L. REv. 2409, 2489 (2003).
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equality in the value of one's vote must be paramount. 22 3 It follows that
equal representation is one aspect of the individual fundamental right to
vote, especially because it affects voters directly with respect to their
interaction with the political process and ensures the legitimacy of their
224
elected leaders.
This theory demonstrates why the Court should have been explicit
and used strict scrutiny in Bush v. Gore.225 The majority stated that

"[w]hen the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its
people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental;
and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter."' 226 The
Court then purported to determine whether the Florida recount procedure
was "consistent with [the] obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate
treatment of the members of its electorate. ' 227 Perhaps one of the most
interesting aspects of Bush v. Gore was that at least seven Justices agreed
that Florida's recount scheme violated the fundamental right to vote
under the Equal Protection Clause. 228 But the case is frustrating for
scholars trying to discern a governing principle, because the Court con223 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964) ("Other rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for
classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right.").
224 See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 292-93, 300 (1975) (striking down an election
procedure for bond initiatives whereby an initiative would pass only if approved by both a
majority of all persons owning taxable property rendered for taxation (renderers) and by a
majority of the entire electorate). The law therefore distinguished between renderers and nonrenderers when counting votes. Id. at 292-93. In holding that the state failed to demonstrate a
compelling state interest sustaining this classification, the Court properly treated the right involved as an individual fundamental right. Id. at 300.
225 Bush, 531 U.S. 98 (per curiam).
226 Id.
227 Id.

at 104.
at 105.

228 See id. at I I I ("Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a remedy. The
only disagreement is as to the remedy." (citations omitted)); see also id. at 126 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Admittedly, the use of differing substandards for determining voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems may raise serious concerns."); id. at 134
(Souter, J.,dissenting) ("I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served by these differing
treatments of the expressions of voters' fundamental rights. The differences appear wholly
arbitrary."). Cf id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I agree with Justice Stevens that petitioners have not presented a substantial equal protection claim."). Justice Breyer seemed to
agree with the majority that the recount procedure may have lacked fundamental fairness in its
treatment of voters' intent:
[S]ince the use of different standards could favor one or the other of the candidates,
since time was, and is, too short to permit the lower courts to iron out significant
differences through ordinary judicial review, and since the relevant distinction was
embodied in the order of the State's highest court, I agree that, in these very special
circumstances, basic principles of fairness should have counseled the adoption of a
uniform standard to address the problem.
Ild.
at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Thus, most of the Justices agreed that the recount procedure might have infringed on the fundamental right to vote, and at least seven of the Justices
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spicuously omitted any references to strict scrutiny review. 229 The Court
would have been on firmer ground-at least in its recognition of a constitutional violation-had it not only called the right at issue fundamental
but also employed a fundamental rights approach. In short, the Court's
cases and methodology demonstrate that the fundamental right to vote,
which is an individual right, should include the right to have one's vote
counted equally and in the same manner as every other vote so as to
promote "equal dignity" for each voter. 230 The Court should consistently
use strict scrutiny review for these cases.
Another fundamental rights subset involves laws that determine
who may cast a ballot. Much like the issues in the one person-one vote
cases, laws regulating who may vote directly burden individual rights.
These laws make explicit distinctions regarding the eligibility of certain
people to cast a ballot. For example, in Evans v. Cornman, the Court
struck down a Maryland law that restricted those living at the federal
National Institutes of Health from voting.2 3 I The law implicated a fundamental right because it burdened voters directly, explicitly denying the
right to vote to a certain class of people. 2 32 The same was true in
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, where the Court struck
down a New York law that limited the right to vote in school district
elections solely to property owners and parents, thereby granting the
233
franchise to certain individuals but not others.
This discussion demonstrates that the Court's approach in both
Lassiter and Rosario was flawed. In Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections, the Court upheld a literacy requirement to vote, noting that the law did not discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, or
sex.234 What the law did do, however, was grant the right to vote to
some citizens but not to others. 235 Therefore, the Court should have analyzed the law under strict scrutiny review because the law burdened an
individual's right to vote. Similarly, in Rosario v. Rockefeller, the Court
upheld a New York law that made a distinction regarding who could vote
in a primary based on when that person had registered with the political
explicitly seemed to agree with the majority's decision on this issue. The real debate regarded
the proper remedy.
229 See Elmendorf, supra note 35, at 331 n.66; Hasen, supra note 32, at 389; see also
supra note 123 and accompanying text.
230 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
231 Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419, 420, 422 (1970).
232 Id. at 422.
233 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
234 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51, 53 (1959). Congress's passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Court's decision in Katzenbach v.
Morgan effectively overruled Lassiter. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966);
supra note 46.
235 See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 52.
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party.2 3 6 The language the Court used demonstrated that it was not concerned with any fundamental right of individual voters. 237 Instead, the
Court focused on the ability of the state to regulate elections. 238 But it is
difficult to distinguish between the rights at stake in Evans and Kramer
and the right at stake in Rosario: all three cases made distinctions between voters and gave the franchise only to voters who met the state's
criteria. 239 The outcome in Rosario may have been correct-that is, the
2 40
law may have been constitutional even under strict scrutiny review.
However, the approach was incorrect because the Court failed to recognize that the law directly impacted individual voters and therefore was
really about the fundamental right to vote.
This analysis highlights where the Court went astray in its recent
voter identification decision. 24' Indiana's photo identification law directly targets voters, not candidates or political parties. Voters must
show photo identification to vote, and legitimate voters are effectively
denied the franchise if they do not comply with the law. 242 This is a

direct restriction on the eligibility of certain individuals. Further, the
lead opinion explicitly recognized that Indiana's voter identification requirement directly burdens a quantifiable segment of individual voters. 243 In particular, the requirement to show identification to vote
burdens elderly people born out-of-state and those with economic limitations.244 The problem with the Court's analysis is that it looked at the
relative magnitude of the burden on different classes of people, instead of
determining which actors in the political spectrum the photo identification law directly affects. Because the law directly burdens individual

236 Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973).
237 For example, instead of carefully scrutinizing the burdens that the "lengthy" time between the enrollment deadline and the next primary election imposed on voters, the Court
focused primarily on the state's goals that the law achieved. See id. at 760.
238 Rosario, 410 U.S. at 761 ("[Plreservation of the integrity of the electoral process is a
legitimate and valid state goal.").
239 Id. at 762; Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 420, 422 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
240 See infra notes 318-26 and accompanying text.
241 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
242 See id. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 1621 (plurality opinion) ("Both evidence in the record and facts of which we
may take judicial notice, however, indicate that a somewhat heavier burden may be placed on
a limited number of persons."); cf Michael J. Pitts, EmpiricallyAssessing the Impact of Photo
Identification at the Polls Through an Examination of ProvisionalBallots, J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1287735 (estimating that Indiana did not count approximately 400 provisional ballots in its 2008
presidential primary because the voters failed to present a photo identification).
244 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621 (plurality opinion).
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voters, the Court should have used strict scrutiny review to protect the
245
fundamental right to vote.
The third category of election laws that involve the fundamental
right to vote are those that speak to a voter's experience at the polls or
restrict how a voter expresses his or her preferences. These cases involve a fundamental right because they directly impact how a voter actually participates in our democracy. Burson v. Freeman falls into this
category. 246 Burson, a case about an advertising ban around a polling
site, involved an individual's fundamental right to vote with respect to
his or her experience at the polls, as the law ensured that voters would
not be inundated with political advertisements while waiting to exercise
the franchise. 247 The case concerned the actual, direct burdens a voter
might face while going to cast a ballot.24 8 Similarly, the Court should

have used a fundamental rights approach in Burdick v. Takushi, where
the Court upheld a ban on write-in voting. 249 This case was not a ballot
access case, because the law in question did not regulate who could appear on the ballot. 250 Instead, the case was about how a voter could
express his or her preferences. 25 1 If a voter did not opt for any of the
choices on the ballot, the write-in ban constrained the voter not to vote at
all instead of allowing the voter to express an alternative political choice.
Because a restriction on how a voter casts a ballot impacts that individual
voter, the Court should have construed the law as infringing upon an
individual fundamental right to participate in our democracy, which
would require strict scrutiny review.

245

Of course, a state might be able to demonstrate that its voter identification law is

narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of combating fraud. It is doubtful,
however, that Indiana's law would have passed muster, given that it is the "most restrictive"
voter identification law in the country. See id. at 1644-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
246 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200-01, 211 (1992).
247 Id. at 195.
248 Id. at 205-06.
249 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434-35, 441 (1992).
250 Professor Tokaji disagrees, arguing that Burdick was akin to a ballot access case because it limited voters' choices as opposed to preventing voters from voting or having their
votes counted. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Judicial Review of Election Administration, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 379, 383 (2008), availableat http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/02-

2008lTokaji.pdf. But this explanation fails to take into account which political actor suffers
the most direct burden under a law. Burdick directly restricted what voters could do, not what
candidates or political parties could do. In contrast to the ballot access cases, the law directly
limited voters' choices, because they could not even express "no preference" without abstaining from voting altogether. Therefore Burdick entailed the same type of burden as laws
that limit who may exercise the franchise.
251 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434-35.
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Laws that Only Tangentially Impact Individual Voters' Rights

The Court has used the severe burden test for virtually all election
law cases, but that test is appropriate, if at all, only for cases involving
laws that indirectly impact voters' rights. Indeed, the cases that created
the severe burden test-Anderson v. Celebrezze252 and Norman v.
Reed 253-involved ballot access laws, which only burdened voters indirectly by limiting the choice of candidates. But the Court has used the
severe burden test for all types of election laws-even those that directly
impact voters such as the write-in ban in Burdick or the voter identification law in Crawford.254 The Court should stay true to the original purposes of the severe burden test by limiting it to those laws that directly
burden political parties or candidates. This approach still will protect
voters, because if a law imposes a severe burden on voters, the Court will
be required to review it under strict scrutiny. But it also allows states to
regulate elections and ensure fairness. In short, the Court should separate laws that directly burden voters from laws that indirectly impact voters, and should always use strict scrutiny for the former and the severe
burden test for the latter.
Ballot access cases, which restrict candidates' rights, provide a cogent example of when the state should have a greater ability to promulgate election laws, particularly because these laws regulate voters only
indirectly. Thus, the Court was incorrect in Bullock v. Carter (a ballot
access case) when it stated that "the rights of voters and the rights of
candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect
candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on
voters. '255 Laws that restrict who may be a candidate only indirectly
impact voters' rights, because the law is directed at candidates, not individual voters. Voters still can express their political preferences even if a
particular candidate is not on the ballot, assuming that there is no writein ban (which would have to survive strict scrutiny review because that
type of law directly burdens individual voters). Candidates have no fundamental right to be on the ballot-participation in our democracy stems
256
from every citizen having the ability to cast a vote, not run for office.
It follows that laws that make distinctions regarding who can be a candidate do not touch upon a fundamental right because they only impact
252 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
253 Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
254 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434-35; see also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128
S. Ct. 1610, 1624-25 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
255 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
256 See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982) ("Far from recognizing candidacy
as a 'fundamental right,' we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate's access to
the ballot 'does not of itself compel close scrutiny."' (quoting Bullock v.Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
143 (1972)).
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voters peripherally. Therefore, the Court should consistently use the severe burden test for all ballot access cases and employ strict scrutiny
review to these laws only if the law in question imposes a severe burden
on voters.
The Court should also use the severe burden test for cases that regulate political parties' primary systems. For example, in Clingman v. Beaver, the Court upheld Oklahoma's "semiclosed" primary system and
omitted any reference to a fundamental right, instead stating that "not
every electoral law that burdens associational rights is subject to strict
scrutiny. '25 7 As noted above, an election law that directly burdens individual voters impacts the (individual) fundamental right to vote and deserves strict scrutiny review. The Oklahoma law, by contrast, merely
regulated political parties and thus only indirectly impacted voters. That
is, the severe burden test was appropriate in this setting because the law
did not directly impact an individual fundamental right to vote but in258
stead concerned how a political party could choose its candidates.
The key question should be who the law actually restricts-if the law is
directed at individuals, it implicates voters' rights directly and the Court
should always use strict scrutiny. If the law restricts a different stakeholder, such as a candidate or political party, then the Court should invoke the severe burden test because no individual fundamental rights are
involved. Making a principled distinction between cases involving the
fundamental right of individual voters and the non-fundamental right of
candidates or political parties will go a long way toward eradicating the
confusion in this area.
The final inquiry under this analysis is, how should we distinguish
between laws that regulate individuals and laws that regulate another
stakeholder such as candidates or political parties? If the fundamental
right to vote is dependent on directly burdening voters, then there must
be a principle to separate laws that might fall into either category. This
should be a fairly simple inquiry. A court merely should discern what
group the law impacts most directly: does the law directly restrict voters
in a particular way, or does the law instead affect voters based upon how
it regulates another actor in the political spectrum? Burdick provides a
good example of this proposition. 259 Although the law was perhaps anal260
ogous to a ballot access case in that it limited the choices available,
the law directly limited what voters could do to express their political
preferences. The law altered the behavior of voters themselves, not po257 Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005).
258 Id.; see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184
(2008) (allowing candidates to self-identify with a party on the primary ballot without that
party's approval).
259 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434-35 (1992).
260 See Tokaji, supra note 250, at 383.
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litical parties or candidates, and therefore involved an individual fundamental right. In contrast, a law that limits who can appear on the ballot
directly restricts the candidate, even if the supporters of that candidate
indirectly suffer a burden in not being allowed to vote for that person. If
a court remembers this foundational principle, it can discern whether the
law directly regulates an individual right to vote or indirectly impacts
voters, thereby dictating which test to use.
Perhaps this scheme will encourage states to enact more regulations
that indirectly burden voters, knowing that they can enjoy a less stringent
level of scrutiny than if the law places direct restrictions on individuals.
That would be a positive unintended consequence. Laws that should
cause concern are those that directly stop individuals from casting a ballot; a state is unlikely to be able to achieve the same level of regulation
of individuals through a law that only indirectly touches voters. 2 61 Further, the severe burden test militates against laws that burden voters too
much, even if that burden is indirect, because it requires a court to employ strict scrutiny if the law imposes a severe burden on voters' rights.
B.

Rethinking Strict Scrutiny for "FundamentalRights" Election Law
Cases

A reformation of the Court's election law jurisprudence is not complete merely by redefining what it means to have a fundamental right to
vote. The Court should also reform its approach to strict scrutiny review
for election law cases where strict scrutiny applies (i.e., for fundamental
rights laws that directly burden voters or for laws that indirectly impact
voters but impose a severe burden). That is, because voting is such an
important aspect of our democracy, and because states have a unique
interest in regulating elections, the Court should carefully define the
strict scrutiny test in the election law context.
"Strict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory but fatal in fact.' "262 This is
nowhere more true than for voting rights. 263 If the Court had always
reviewed election law challenges under strict scrutiny but provided states
with "a limited degree of leeway" 264 to regulate elections in a manner
that is appropriate to election law claims, many of its decisions would
have come out the same way. This is because preventing election fraud
is a compelling governmental interest, and many election regulations are
261 For example, it is difficult to think of how a state could require a voter to show identification at the polls by enacting a law that actually regulates candidates or political parties.
262 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (citations omitted).
263 See Adam Winkler, Fatalin Theory and Strict in Fact: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 863 (2006) (concluding through a
statistical analysis that laws regulating a fundamental right are still upheld about a quarter of
the time under strict scrutiny review).
264 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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narrowly tailored to meet that goal. A renewed focus on the narrowly
tailored prong will provide a way for states to continue regulating elections because it suggests a guide to the types of laws that are constitutionally permissible.
The Supreme Court has declared that "not every electoral law that
burdens associational rights is subject to strict scrutiny." 265 However,
the Court made that statement in the context of its concern that always
using strict scrutiny will result in the Court striking down every election
law and handcuffing states' ability to regulate an election. 266 But always
treating the right to vote as fundamental when a law directly impacts
individual voters' rights will not necessarily mean that a state can never
justify its election regulation under strict scrutiny review. This is particularly true given that a law can be narrowly tailored and still adversely
impact a small number of voters so long as there is not a better way to
267
regulate the election in a manner that infringes fewer voters' rights.
Therefore, "the States [still will] have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other ways. '26 8 Indeed,
states enact many of their election laws to combat voter fraud or to run a
fair election, which are compelling state interests. 26 9 So long as the
state's law is narrowly tailored to effectuate one of those goals-that is,
so long as there is not a demonstrably "better" way to achieve the same
goals given that states still should have some leeway in regulating an
election-the Court need not strike down the law under this understanding of strict scrutiny review. This Part demonstrates that principle.
Before diving into the analysis, however, one final point is warranted: one might question why the Court's approach even matters if its
ultimate decisions in many, if not most, of its cases are correct. The
answer should be obvious: if the Court is inconsistent, then litigants and
lower courts will have no principle to guide them in future cases. A
simpler and clearer approach will streamline election law litigation. Further, as discussed above, the Court's current fractured methodology
270
sends troubling signals about the importance of the right to vote.
Thus, there is both a practical reason and a normative goal in seeking
consistency: redefining the meaning of the right to vote and the level of
265 Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005).
266 Id. at 593 ("To deem ordinary and widespread burdens like these severe would subject
virtually every electoral regulation to strict scrutiny, hamper the ability of States to run efficient and equitable elections, and compel federal courts to rewrite state electoral codes.").
267 See infra Part IV.B.1.b.
268 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).

269 See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (per curiam); Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989).
270 See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny it enjoys will provide clarity to lower courts and will enlighten
future jurisprudence about this key principle in our democracy.
1. Compelling Interest and Narrow Tailoring: A Context-specific
Approach
The Supreme Court first used the precise term "strict scrutiny" to
describe a particular test in 1942 in Skinner v. Oklahoma.27 1 Professor
Adam Winkler summarized the two-prong test for strict scrutiny as
follows:
Courts first determine if the underlying governmental
ends, or objectives, are "compelling." According to
[Professor] Linde, "the Court uses compelling in the vernacular to describe [the] societal importance" of the government's reasons for enacting the challenged law.
Because the government is impinging upon someone's
core constitutional rights, only the most pressing circumstances can justify the government action. If the governmental ends are compelling, the courts then ask if the
law is a narrowly tailored means of furthering those governmental interests. Narrow tailoring requires that the
law capture within its reach no more activity (or less)
than is necessary to advance those compelling ends. An
alternative phrasing is that the law must be the "least
restrictive alternative" available to pursue those ends.
This inquiry into "fit" between the ends and the means
enables courts to test the sincerity of the government's
272
claimed objective.
Thus, the question in an election law case is first, whether the state
has demonstrated a compelling interest for enacting the election regulation, and second, whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to effectuate
that goal.
a.

Compelling interest

The Court has stated that preventing voter fraud is a compelling
governmental interest. 273 "A State indisputably has a compelling interest
in preserving the integrity of its election process. '274 Indeed, the Court
has noted that "[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is
271 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Winkler, supra
note 263, at 799.
272 Winkler, supra note 263, at 800-01.

273 See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (per curiam).
274 Eu, 489 U.S. at 231.
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essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy. Voter fraud
drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust
of our government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised. ' 275 Therefore, all
a state needs to do for this prong in a challenge to an election regulation
is to show that the state enacted the law pursuant to the goal of "preserving the integrity of its election process. '2 76 Elections are the most important aspect of a democratic society; the Constitution gives states the right
to dictate the "times, places, and manner" 277 of holding an election probably because states are in the best position to ensure fairness at the local
level.
The Court's election law cases demonstrate that states can usually
meet this burden. Dunn v. Blumstein278 is particularly apt for this point.
There, Tennessee had enacted a durational residence requirement for voting, meaning that newly arrived citizens did not have the right to the
franchise. 279 As noted above, this law impacted an (individual) fundamental right to vote because it directly distinguished between which voters were eligible to exercise the franchise and which voters were not. 280
The state asserted that this law helped to achieve the compelling governmental interest of protecting against voter fraud. 281 In striking down the
law, the Court did not dispute that preventing fraud is a compelling state
interest. 28 2 Instead, the Court invalidated the regulation because it did
not actually serve that purpose. 28 3 "Preventing fraud, the asserted evil
that justifies state lawmaking, means keeping nonresidents from voting.
But, by definition, a durational residence law bars newly arrived residents from the franchise along with nonresidents. ' '284 Thus, although
the state had asserted a compelling governmental interest, the law was
not tailored narrowly enough to meet that goal.
The Court's holding in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party similarly showed that the state had demonstrated a compelling governmental interest under strict scrutiny. 285 The Court noted
that a state has a compelling interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot to ensure that voters can make rational choices be275
276
277
278

Purcell, 549 U.S. at 7.
Eu, 489 U.S. at 231.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
279 Id. at 334.
280 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
281 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 345.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.

285 Ill.
State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184-87 (1979).
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tween serious candidates. 2 86 However, the Court struck down the
regulation limiting ballot access because "[t]he signature requirements
for independent candidates and new political parties seeking offices in
Chicago are plainly not the least restrictive means of protecting the
State's objectives. '287 Similarly, the Court has ruled that a state has a
compelling interest in deterring frivolous candidacies to assure that "the
winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those
voting, without the expense and burden of runoff elections. '288 Yet the
Court struck down Texas's requirement that candidates pay a filing fee to
appear on the ballot because the state could not show even a "rational
relationship between a candidate's willingness to pay a filing fee and the
seriousness with which he takes his candidacy. '28 9 Once again, therefore, it was the narrowly tailored prong that doomed the election law in
question, even though the state had asserted a compelling interest for its
law.

290

A state will lose an election law case on this prong only if the state
fails to show that its regulation is pursuant to combating voter fraud,
limiting the number of frivolous candidacies, effectively selecting a winner, or some other compelling interest.29 1 This should be so; states have
no interest in burdening voters if it is not for a sufficiently important
reason. Thus, in Williams v. Rhodes, the Court struck down an Ohio
scheme that posed significant burdens on minor political parties from
appearing on the ballot because the state did not have a compelling interest in favoring the Republican and Democratic parties over minor parties.292 As another example, in Hill v. Stone, the Court struck down an
election procedure for bond initiatives whereby, to pass, the initiative
required a vote of "yes" from both a majority of all persons owning taxable property rendered for taxation and a majority of the entire electorate.293 The Court held that the state did not have a compelling interest
in promoting the voluntary rendering of property for taxation. 294 These
cases make clear that when analyzing whether the state has met the first
286 Id. at 185-86.
287 Id. at 186.
288 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
289 Id. at 146.
290 Of course, given that many of the cases in this discussion involved ballot access laws,
under the formulation of what is a fundamental right to vote as discussed in the previous
section, the state would need to meet strict scrutiny only if the laws imposed a severe burden
on voters, as the laws did not directly burden individual voters. See supra notes 252-56 and
accompanying text.
291 See, e.g., Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (per curiam); Eu v. S.F. County
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989); Ill.
State Bd., 440 U.S. at 185-86; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145.
292 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
293 Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 291-92 (1975).
294 Id. at 300-01.
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prong of the strict scrutiny test, the Court will hold that states may validly enact laws that are pursuant to combating voter fraud or regulating
an election but may not burden voters for some other reason that is not
pursuant to a compelling governmental interest. The preceding discussion also highlights that the narrowly tailored prong provides the key to
most election law disputes under strict scrutiny.
b.

Narrow tailoring

The Court has not provided a detailed discussion of what the narrowly tailored prong entails for an election law dispute. This is despite
the fact that, as mentioned above, the narrowly tailored prong usually
provides the "meat" of the controversy. Therefore, any discussion of
whether the Court needed to create a second line of non-fundamental
rights cases for election law must include an understanding of how the
Court should analyze this prong.
In Bush v. Vera, a plurality of the Court recognized that states have
some discretion to create electoral districts even under the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny. 295 The Court "reaffirm[ed] that the 'narrow tailoring' requirement of strict scrutiny allows the States a limited
degree of leeway in furthering" its compelling interests of ensuring fair
electoral districts and complying with Section Two of the Voting Rights
Act.296 The Court recognized that "[i]f the State has a 'strong basis in
evidence'

. . .

for concluding that creation of a majority-minority district

is reasonably necessary to comply with § 2, and the districting that is
based on race 'substantially addresses the § 2 violation,' . . . it satisfies
strict scrutiny. ' 297 There is no reason why the Court cannot include this

same mode of narrow tailoring analysis for all election law cases.
This approach to narrow tailoring makes sense given the context of
an election law dispute where, even though the individual right to vote is
a fundamental right, the state has a constitutional requirement to regulate
the "times, places, and manner" of holding an election. 298 The Court has
recognized that narrow tailoring can signify different things in different
settings, meaning that the right involved is still fundamental, but that the
299
requirements for narrow tailoring depend on the specifics of that right.
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
Id. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor had originally rejected what she termed "watereddown strict scrutiny" before recognizing in Bush v. Vera the multifaceted contours of the
narrowly tailored prong for certain types of cases. See Paul H. Dickerson, The Future of
Racial Redistricting in Voting: Clark v. Calhoun County, Mississippi, 16 IN PUB. INTEREST
129, 154-56 (1997/1998).
297 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 977 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (internal citations
omitted).
298 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
299 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340-41 (2003).
295

296

192

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18:143

Just as narrow tailoring meant one thing for drawing electoral districts to
achieve racial equality, in the university admissions and affirmative action context, the Court has stated,
Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative. Nor does it require
a university to choose between maintaining a reputation
for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all racial
groups ....Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university
3o
seeks.
There is no reason to limit a context-specific approach to narrow
tailoring only to issues involving race or to instances where a state is
attempting to comply with a statute. Instead, the Court can create a specific rule for what it means to narrowly tailor an election regulation. As
Professor Peter Rubin argues, an approach to strict scrutiny should "explore[ ] dimensions along which appropriately 'strict' scrutiny of governmental actions should rationally be calibrated to address in each different
context the particular concerns that warrant close examination in the first
place."'30 1 In this regard, Professor Rubin recognized that the narrowly
tailored prong serves at least three purposes:
First, it ensures that the stated purpose was indeed the
actual purpose behind the classification. A narrow tailoring inquiry can help to "smoke out" illegitimate purposes by demonstrating that the classification does not,
in fact, serve the stated, legitimate purpose. Second, it
checks stereotyped thinking. When a classification is
based not on a factual distinction between one and another group, but on a stereotype, that classification will
fail the narrow tailoring inquiry. Finally, even when the
classification does correlate with some genuine distinction between the two groups, the narrow tailoring inquiry assures that the classification only will be used
when there is some degree of necessity for its use if the
governmental purpose is to be achieved. This aspect of
the narrow tailoring inquiry is not really about "fit," but
about comparing the marginal benefits and costs of the
300 Id. at 339 (internal citations omitted).
301 Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to
Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 10 (2000).
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use of a particular classification with those of some al30 2
ternative if there is one.
In construing the precise contours of the narrowly tailored prong for
election law cases, the Court can borrow from the language in Bush v.
Vera, which already applied a "limited degree of leeway" or "strong basis in evidence" approach for drawing electoral maps because of the
unique nature of that issue. 30 3 Bush v. Vera dealt with a state's attempt
to comply with a statute; cases about regulations that affect the fundamental right to vote involve a state's mandate to comply with the Constitution. 3°4 Professor Elmendorf identifies a slightly different approach in
his description of Dunn v. Blumstein, arguing that under what he terms
"best-practices strict scrutiny of individual-rights infringements," the
Court "asks whether the challenged law approximates the 'best' or least
burdensome version of its type that has proven workable in other jurisdictions. Only if it does is the law sustained.130 5 Similarly, as the Court
suggested in Kusper v. Pontikes, courts should look to the practices of
other jurisdictions to determine if the state's scheme is the least restrictive means of achieving its goals. 30 6 Along those lines, although the
state has the burden of showing that its law is narrowly tailored, voters
often attempt to demonstrate that the state cannot meet this burden by
presenting a viable alternative. 30 7 If the state persuades the Court that
302 Id. at 14 (citations omitted). Professor Crump suggests another method of construing
the narrowly tailored prong for all cases, which borrows from the Court's approach in the
speech context. See David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action
Cases: Reconsidering the Supreme Court's Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based Decision-Making by Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L. REv. 483, 522 (2004). Professor
Crump argues that the Court should adopt the formulation of narrow tailoring from Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 602 (1973), where the Court stated that, to be unconstitutional,
"the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615). Under this
approach,
[T]he imposition of a significant harmful impact upon protected speech to achieve
the prohibition of a minor range of disfavored conduct is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional for the same reason that using a Howitzer to kill a fly is excessive. On
the other hand, if the impact of a statute falls largely upon conduct that the State is
permitted to prohibit, and if the discouragement of protected speech is incidental (or,
in the terms used by the Court, if it is not "substantial"), the statute is constitutional.
Crump, supra, at 522-23.
303 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 977 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
304 See id.
305 Elmendorf, supra note 35, at 344. As Professor Elmendorf points out, Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973), exemplifies this approach, as the Court struck down the Illinois law
in part because a similar and less restrictive New York law achieved the exact same purpose.
Elmendorf, supra, at 353-54.
306 See Kusper, 414 U.S. at 59.
307 See William H. Jordan, Protecting Speech v. Protecting Children: An Examination of
the Judicial Refusal to Allow Legislative Action in the Realm of Minors and Internet Pornography, 57 S.C. L. REv.489, 499 (2006) ("To satisfy the least restrictive means element of the
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any less restrictive alternatives the voters propose would not be as effective as the challenged regulation, then the state may have satisfied its
burden (assuming that the Court does not, on its own, perceive another
308
less restrictive alternative).
Justice Breyer highlighted this approach in the Supreme Court's recent voter identification case. 3°9 One reason Justice Breyer dissented in
Crawford was that Indiana's photo identification law was the most restrictive law of its type in the country. 3 10 Justice Breyer compared the
Indiana law to the laws in Florida and Georgia, and determined that those
states had found a way to require the presentation of identification that
was less burdensome than Indiana's law. 3'1 Florida and Georgia provide
more alternatives for voters, such as a broader range of the types of identification a voter may show (Florida) or a larger number of documents
3 12
that a voter can present to obtain suitable identification (Georgia).
Florida allows a voter without identification to cast a provisional ballot,
and the state will count the vote if the signature on the provisional ballot
matches the one on the voter's registration form. 3 13 Georgia allows any
voter to vote absentee without having to show identification. 3 14 In contrast, the Indiana law allows fewer types of permissible identification,
requires a person casting a provisional ballot to travel to the county clerk
or county election board to show identification or sign an affidavit, and
restricts who may vote by absentee ballot. 3 15 Justice Breyer found that
Florida and Georgia have achieved the same goals as Indiana of preventing election fraud while using a less restrictive means. 3 16 Under a fundamental-rights-plus-strict-scrutiny analysis, Indiana's law would not be
narrowly tailored because the voters could show alternative workable
methods of achieving the same goals, as other states had successfully
adopted these methods.
These two concepts-that states have limited leeway to regulate
elections under a context-specific approach to narrow tailoring and that
states often rebut a challenge under this prong by establishing that the
voters' suggested alternatives would be less effective than the current
narrowly tailored standard, the government must prove that any less restrictive alternatives
proposed by the plaintiff would not be as effective as the challenged statute." (quotation marks
and citations omitted)).
308 Id. at 499.
309 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1644-45 (2008)
(Breyer, J.,dissenting).
310 See id.; see also id. at 1635 n. 26 (Souter, J., dissenting).

311 Id. at 1644-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
312 Id. at 1644.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 1644-45.
315 Id. at 1645.
316 See id.
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scheme-demonstrate that the narrowly tailored prong need not be unduly restrictive of a state's ability to regulate an election. Additionally,
this approach preserves the individual aspect of the right to vote as a
fundamental right.
Combining the relevant aspects of the proposed tests, the narrow
tailoring prong of strict scrutiny for election law cases should involve a
two-part inquiry: first, does the law fall within the state's limited leeway
to regulate elections? In other words, does the state have a strong basis
in evidence that the law is the best regulation to effectuate the state's
goals? This prong includes an examination of the "fit" between the
state's goals and the methods it has employed. Second, are there any
alternatives that would be more effective in regulating the election without burdening voters' rights (i.e., is there a proper weighing of the benefits versus the burdens of the law)? In this way, "narrowly tailored" can
have specific meaning for election law cases. This two-part test appropriately balances the interests of the state with the fundamental nature of
the right to vote. It ensures that states burden that right significantly only
if there is a good enough reason. This approach would have been better
than creating conflicting lines of cases where the right to vote is sometimes fundamental, sometimes not, because it maintains the importance
of the right involved, provides consistency, and still allows states to regulate elections.
2.

Analyzing the Court's Cases Using this New Understanding
of Strict Scrutiny for Election Law Disputes

With these principles in mind, it follows that the Court did not need
to create a new line of cases and derogate the individual right to vote as
less than fundamental to reach its holding in many of its cases. In several decisions where the Court upheld election laws using a lower standard than strict scrutiny, the decisions would have likely been the same
under a consistent fundamental rights approach that calibrates the narrowly tailored prong to the specific context of an election law dispute,
requiring the state to show a "strong basis in evidence" that its law is the
3 7
best and least restrictive means of complying with the Constitution. 1
Of course, just based on the language of the Court's decisions, whether
the state had a strong basis in evidence that its law was the best way to
achieve a compelling interest pursuant to its constitutional mandate is
317 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citation
omitted); see also Nelson Ebaugh, Note, Refining the Racial Gerrymandering Claim: Bush v.
Vera, 33 TULSA L.J. 613, 638 (1997) ("The standards for satisfying the narrow tailoring requirement are high but they are not impossible to achieve. The plurality is not looking for
perfection in narrow tailoring; they are simply looking for a good faith effort and something
close to this will likely satisfy strict scrutiny.").
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mere speculation. Nevertheless, it is at least plausible that the state could
have made this showing in many of these cases.
Rosario v. Rockefeller provides a cogent example of this principle. 318 In Rosario, the Court used a lower level of scrutiny to uphold a

New York law regulating which voters could participate in a primary
election. 3 19 This law directly burdened individual voters and therefore
involved a fundamental right. As noted above, deterring fraudulent elections is always a compelling state interest. 320 Further, the Court stated
that the statute in question-which required voters to register with a
party within thirty days of the previous general election-assisted the
state in achieving this goal by helping to ensure that voters were not
participating with malicious intent. 32 1 A pre-registration deadline of
thirty days before the previous general election-which had the effect
requiring registration eight months prior to a presidential primary (in
June) or eleven months prior to a nonpresidential primary (in September)-hardly seems to sweep too broadly based on a narrowly tailored
prong that gives states "limited leeway" to regulate elections. 322 Allowing voters to switch parties right before a primary could attract voters
from an opposing party to try to skew the results of another party's primary; 323 this apparently occurred in open primary states during the 2008
election. 324 For purposes of the New York law in Rosario, a waiting
period of this length seemed to be a good "fit" to deter voters from
switching parties solely to taint the results of the primary. While a preregistration deadline of a longer time might not meet this test,325 presum-

ably New York could show a strong basis in evidence that thirty days
before the previous general election achieved the state's goals while infringing the rights of the fewest voters. Further, there is no indication
that the voters could have come up with a less drastic alternative given
New York's legitimate concern about party-raiding. 326 Thus, under an
318 See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973).
319 See id.
320 See id. at 761; see, e.g., Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (per curiam); Eu v.
S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989); see also supra Part IV.B.l.a.
321 Rosario, 410 U.S. at 761 (noting that the statute helped the state to achieve its goal of
preserving the integrity of the electoral process by deterring party raiding in a primary
election).
322 See id. at 754, 760; see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 977 (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion).
323 See Rosario, 410 U.S. at 761.
324 See, e.g., Clay Robinson, Commentary, Democratic PrimaryAlso a GOP One, HousTON CHRON., Feb. 24, 2008, at B 1, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/hotstories/5566595.html.
325 See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973) (striking down a law prohibiting a
voter from participating in a political party's primary if the voter had voted in the primary of
any other party within the preceding twenty-three months).
326 See Rosario, 419 U.S. at 761-62.
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approach to strict scrutiny that is specific to the context of an election
law claim, the state likely would have prevailed, even though this case
involved an individual fundamental right to vote: preventing party raiding is a compelling state interest, and the statute likely was narrowly
tailored to achieve that goal.
Burdick v. Takushi teaches the same lesson. 327 The Court in Burdick articulated the severe burden test by noting that laws that do not
3 28
severely burden the right to vote do not require strict scrutiny review.
But the Court still could have upheld Hawaii's ban on write-in voting
under strict scrutiny. The Court should have used this standard given
that the law directly restricted voters' choices at the polls. First, the state
asserted several compelling interests for forbidding voters from writing
in a candidate: the write-in ban helped to "avoid the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the general election" and "guard against 'party
raiding.' ",329 Second, the statute was narrowly tailored to further these
goals, because it averted "sore loser" candidates who might try to run a
write-in campaign and ensured that an independent who had failed to win
sufficient votes to be placed on the general election ballot did not taint
the result of the general election. 330 There was likely a strong basis in
evidence for having a law that limited write-in candidates given Hawaii's
lax requirements for appearing on the ballot. 331 That is, the "fit" be-

tween the state's goals and the law was strong given the other parts of the
state's electoral code. Indeed, another state's write-in ban possibly
would not survive strict scrutiny review if the state's ballot access requirements were stricter. However, the fact that virtually anyone could
qualify for the ballot in Hawaii meant that the state had a sufficiently
compelling reason to limit write-in candidacies given that there was no
less restrictive alternative to deter sore losers from running write-in
332
campaigns.
327 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).

328 See id. at 433-34.
329 Id. at 439 (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 219 (1986)).
330 See id. at 439-40.
331 See id. at 436-37.
332 The majority chastised the dissent for employing strict scrutiny review to argue that
the law should be struck down. See id. at 440 n.10. Indeed, it is not clear that the dissent's
suggestion to use a "less drastic means" to deter "sore-loser candidacies" or to screen out
ineligible candidates through postelection disqualification would have achieved the same goals

of promoting fair elections as did Hawaii's write-in ban. Thus, even when the dissent used
strict scrutiny, its argument was perhaps flawed because it could not point to a viable alternative. Or perhaps there was a better way of achieving these goals that would not be overinclusive, as the dissent suggested. See id at 449 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). If so, then this case
should have gone the other way and the Court should have struck down the law. However,
given that the dissent could not articulate a specific method that would be narrower and yet
still would achieve the state's exact same goals, the Court probably decided the case correctly,
albeit through the wrong method.
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Admittedly, this would be a close case, and perhaps the Court
should have struck down the write-in ban because it unduly infringed on
the fundamental right to vote by restricting voters from expressing a particular political preference. But a contrary ruling would cause little concern given that states have wider discretion to regulate access to the
ballot, meaning that states can limit the number of viable candidates.
This analysis underscores the conclusion that the Court should vigorously protect the individual right to vote because it is a fundamental
right, but that states can still regulate elections either through the limited
leeway approach to strict scrutiny or by restrictions on ballot access as
opposed to burdening individual voters.
Storer v. Brown, among the first cases to make clear that the Court
would not use strict scrutiny for all election law claims, involved a California scheme that limited access to the ballot for independent candidates
if they had been affiliated with a political party within the previous
334
year. 333 The Court upheld the law under a lower level of scrutiny.
This standard was not necessarily incorrect given that the law involved
access to the ballot, which only impacted voters indirectly and thus did
not regulate an individual's fundamental right to vote. But even if the
law imposed a severe burden, the Court could have come out the same
way under strict scrutiny. Preserving the integrity of the election process
is a compelling state interest. Therefore, the statute would be constitutional if the state could demonstrate that it was narrowly tailored to
achieve that goal. The Court implicitly answered that question in the
affirmative:
The provision against defeated primary candidates running as independents effectuates this aim, the visible result being to prevent the losers from continuing the
struggle and to limit the names on the ballot to those
who have won the primaries and those independents who
have properly qualified. The people, it is hoped, are
presented with understandable choices and the winner in
the general election with sufficient support to govern
335
effectively.
This language suggests that the state demonstrated a strong basis in
evidence that its law directly achieved its goals, and the Court did not
mention any alternative methods. Therefore, the law, in theory and in
333 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726 (1974).
334 See id. at 736.
335 Id. at 735. Elaborating further, the Court noted that the law "works against independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel. It is also
a substantial barrier to a party fielding an 'independent' candidate to capture and bleed off
votes in the general election that might well go to another party." Id.
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practice, was narrowly tailored to ensure that last-minute independent
candidates did not sully the results of the election, and there was nothing
to indicate that the law reached more voters than necessary to achieve
this goal. The Court would not have needed to resort to a lower level of
scrutiny to uphold this law even if the law imposed a severe burden. It
simply could have examined what it means to "narrowly tailor" a law in
the election law context by adopting this two-part test.
A fairly simplistic hypothetical also illustrates that using strict scrutiny will not doom all election regulations that impact the individual fundamental right to vote or impose a severe burden on voters. Suppose that
a state chooses to close a particular polling place, or even limit the number of machines at each polling site. These laws would impact the fundamental right to vote because they would directly burden individual
voters, as opposed to political parties or candidates. Depending on the
circumstances, the state would very likely have a compelling interest to
enact the law to ensure fairness or preserve limited resources. Additionally, the state frequently can show a strong basis in evidence that its law
is the best alternative to achieve its goals-for example, that the voting
machines can better help to alleviate the long lines at a busier precinct.
So long as the state does not close all polling places and does not, in
effect, restrict the franchise for a particular class of voters, the state has
met its burden under the narrowly tailored prong. 336 In fact, a court
would likely uphold most "routine" election regulations under this approach so long as the state has no viable alternatives and can present an
appropriate fit (i.e., a "strong basis in evidence" that the law will achieve
a compelling state interest 337 ), and so long as those regulations do not
discriminate against a particular group of voters. Laws that do not meet
this test are inherently too restrictive on voters' rights.
This analysis also presents another question: what if, under an understanding of the individual fundamental right to vote and a contextspecific approach to strict scrutiny, the Court would have come out differently in some of its cases? In that instance, the Court's decisions were
wrong when decided under a lower level of scrutiny and should have
gone the other way. Perhaps part of the right to vote is that a voter can
cast a ballot for any person he or she wants, including writing in "Donald
Duck" if the voter so chooses. 338 One goal of this Part is to show that
always treating the right to vote as fundamental when a law directly im336 See Gerald L. Neuman, TerritorialDiscrimination,Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 338 n.329 (1987) ("[A] state could not permit a municipality to close its polling places and exclude its residents from participation in the otherwise
statewide election of a governor.").
337 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
338 See David Perney, Note, The Dimensions of the Right to Vote: The Write-In Vote,
Donald Duck, and Voting Booth Speech Written-Off, 58 Mo. L. REV. 945, 965-67 (1993)
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pacts voters does not mean the upheaval of years of precedent. But is
there anything wrong with requiring states to ensure that their laws are
the best means of regulating an election? A state will usually be able to
meet the first part of the strict scrutiny test because a state has a compelling interest in promoting fair elections that generate a clear winner.
However, if the state's regulation burdens more voters than necessary,
and if there is a better way for the state to achieve its goals of political
stability and running a fair election that is not more burdensome on the
state's resources, then why should the Court rubberstamp the law? The
state has the burden of showing that its law is narrowly tailored to meet
its compelling interest. If the state cannot make this showing, perhaps
because the voters who challenge the law present a better way to achieve
the same purpose, or because the state cannot show a strong basis in
evidence for needing the law, then the Court should require the state to
change its electoral scheme. Not only is that the whole point of the narrowly tailored prong, but it is also the essence of preserving fundamental
rights.
By using strict scrutiny for all election law cases involving the individual fundamental right to vote (and for all cases involving a law that
imposes a severe burden), and by paying particular attention to the narrowly tailored prong, the Court will achieve several goals. First, it will
allow states to continue regulating elections to ensure fairness and integrity in the election process. Second, it will protect voters from the burden of state laws that overreach in trying to achieve the state's goals,
particularly if there is a better way to regulate an election that infringes
fewer voters' rights. Third, it will provide clear guidance to lower courts
and litigants and will help to streamline election law cases. Finally, it
will elevate the importance of the individual right to vote to be on par
with other fundamental rights. We should expect nothing less of the
highest court of the land for protecting one of the most important rights
in our democracy.
CONCLUSION

This Article began with the question, "Is the right to vote really
fundamental?" Unfortunately, under the Court's current jurisprudence,
the answer is not all that clear: sometimes the Court considers the right to
vote to be fundamental, and sometimes it does not. This proposition
might be shocking to many in our democracy. How can the right to vote
not be a fundamental right? Why has the Court treated the right to vote
in some circumstances as less than fundamental? For many complex rea(exploring how Burdick narrowed the scope of the right to vote and discussing the concept that
a vote is a form of political expression that contributes to the marketplace of ideas).
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sons, in some instances the Court has omitted language of fundamental
rights when upholding particular election regulations. As this Article
demonstrates, the Court can remedy this confusion through a multifaceted reform to election law jurisprudence. First, the Court should
redefine what it means to have a fundamental right to vote, applying a
fundamental-rights-plus-strict-scrutiny approach to laws that directly
burden individuals. The Court should use the severe burden test only for
other laws, which typically burden candidates or political parties and impact voters only indirectly. Second, the Court should carefully calibrate
the strict scrutiny test for election law cases, and in particular should
define the narrowly tailored prong so that it comports with the unique
circumstances of an election law dispute. In this way, the right to vote
will remain fundamental, but states can continue to regulate elections to
avoid fraud and ensure fairness. While the answer to the title of this
Article is "not always," the Court can rethink and reevaluate its approach
so that the individual right to vote will always remain a fundamental
right.

